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Economic and Cooperative Post-Colonial
Borders: How Two Interpretations of
Borders by the I.C.J. May Undermine the
Relationship Between Uti Possidetis Juris

and Democracy
Andrew A. Rosen*
This article re-visits the internationallegal concept of uti possidetis
juris through the discussion and analysis of three recent decisions by the
International Court of Justice (I.C.J) (Qatar v. Bahrain, Botswana v.
Namibia, and Cameroon v. Nigeria). In particular,I question whether
the applicationof uti possidetisjuris is conducive to democracy.
Uti possidetis juris is the internationallegal basis for all postcolonial borders and both defines and protects the post-colonialpolity
through a combination of two principles: self-determination and the
non-interference in the affairs of other countries. It is through the
principle of self-determination that uti possidetis juris is linked to
democracy. However, in each of the three cases (each the result of
vaguely-written colonial-era treaties), the I. C.J. has been presented with
arguments asking it to apply uti possidetisjuris based on the economic
interests of the state alone, either explicitly or implicitly, rather than as
representative of the polity or on the administration of the polity. I
conclude the L C.J.'s decisions in these disputes all suggest that uti
possidetisjuris is not conducive to democracy in post-colonial nationstates, as it upholds borders that even those nation-statesdo not consider
as representativeof theirpolity.
I further analyze these decisions through the post-colonial critiques
of borders by Makau wa Mutua, who argues that borders are an imposed
identity, and Mahmood Mamdani, who argues that borders preserve
colonial social and political structures non-conducive to democracy.
* J.D., New York University Law School, 2003; B.A., Yale University, 1998;
Term Member, Council on Foreign Relations. I would like to thank Professor J.H.H.
Weiler, Professor Ayalet Schachar, Osagie Obasagie, and Harlan Cohen for their
invaluable feedback throughout the writing process.
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These critiquesfurther emphasize that uti possidetisjuris may no longer
be consideredconducive to democracy.
I also discuss an alternative to a delineated border proposed in
Justice Weeramantry's dissent in Botswana v. Namibia. Weeramantry
proposed that instead of delineation, certain disputed regions may be
cooperatively governed based on each country's obligations to an
external treaty regime or internationalobligation (e.g., environmental
treaties). I argue that this proposalis an interestingalternativefor postcolonial nation-states, though perhaps not yet feasible. I also discuss
this proposalin light of the post-colonialcritiques of borders.
I conclude by postulating where uti possidetisjuris may stand now
after these decisions. I conclude that it cannot be considered a rule, but
rather a conceptual barrier increasingly unrelated to issues of
democratizationand increasinglychallengedby economic development.
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I.

Introduction

The borders of nation-states, and the definition of a nation-state, are
relatively new organizing concepts to much of the world, particularly the
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post-colonial world.' Borders in Europe and Latin America have been
accepted as nation-state delineations within the past 150 years, and in
Africa, Asia, and the Middle East within the past 20 to 50 years.2 When
considered in light of over 5,000 years of human civilization, the nationstate defined by its borders as an organizational foundation is an
embryonic concept. Today, nonetheless, it is conceptually integral to
international law and a fundamental assumption of its regulatory bodies.
Borders in much of the post-colonial world have been created and
enforced via a concept in international law that dates back to the Roman
Empire: uti possidetis juris. The concept defines borders of newly
sovereign states on the basis of their previous administrative frontiers.4
Uti posseditis juris works through the combination of two principles:
self-determination and the non-interference in the internal affairs of other
countries. 5 Its application has consistently sought one outcome: the
avoidance of terra nullius, which had driven the colonial conquest of the
Great Powers.
There is no simple explanation as to how uti possidetisjuris works,
as its status and application under international law, and its historical
legacy, are uncertain. Consequently, international law provides no
simple answers as to how to apply uti possidetisjuris.
This article will address the status of uti possidetis juris as it
currently stands in international law following three recent decisions by
the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.). I will analyze uti possidetis
juris from two different perspectives: how the I.C.J. has handled direct
challenges to the concept, and how the I.C.J. has handled implicit
challenges to the concept via challenges to its fundamental assumption of
borders as administrative. I will then analyze these challenges in light of
post-colonialist critiques of the compatibility of uti possidetisjuris with

1. The end of colonialism was precipitated by the end of World War II in 1946.
The former Great Powers withdrew from territories in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.
But the process was not instantaneous-France's control over French Indochina ended
with the Geneva Accords in 1954; a majority of African states reached independence in
the 1960s, and the independence of nations in the Middle East came at the end of World
War II, in the 1950s, and in the 1970s. WILLIAM R. KEYLOR, THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY
WORLD: AN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY Asia map at 429, Middle East map at 343, Geneva

Accords at 369 (3rd ed., 1996).
2. This number is calculated based on African states reaching independence in the
1960s, with Zimbabwe achieving independence from Great Britain as recently as 1980,
and Middle Eastern states reaching independence as recently as 1971 (Oman, United
Arab Emirates).
3. Enver Hasani, InternationalLaw Under Fire: Uti PossidetisJuris: From Rome
to Kosovo, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 85.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 86. Hasani traces both ideas back to their application in Latin America at
the beginning of the nineteenth century.
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democratization.6 I will conclude that the I.C.J.'s decisions suggest any
7
link between utipossidetisjurisand democracy may no longer exist.
A. A BriefHistory ofUti Possidetis Juris in the Post-ColonialWorld
The application of uti possidetis juris in the post-colonial world is
rooted in the application of the principle to Latin America at the
beginning of the nineteenth century. 8 This first application followed the
wars for Latin American independence between 1810 and 1824. It
involved establishing new nation-states in Latin America delineated by
their colonial-era administrative boundaries.
In order to establish borders, "boundaries were derived from various
sorts of Spanish governmental instruments setting up hierarchical and
other units. . .," or from borders established by treaty between Spain and
Portugal. 9 Two different rationales guided the application of the
principle in Latin America-first, Europeans sought to transfer the
balance of power politics to Latin America, and the nation-state served as
the foundation for this form of diplomacy; and second, uti possidetis
juris offered Latin American countries some protection from European
interference but moreover, from further border conflicts between newly
independent nations.'°
The second application of the principle took place during the
decolonization of Africa and the breakup of the British Empire after
World War II. In Africa, borders derived initially from "spheres of
influence" - arrangements between European colonial powers that
6. Post-colonial theory is a set of theories in philosophy and literature that address
the legacy of post-colonial rule (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-colonial-theory).
Edward Said's ORIENTALISM is considered to be the founding work of post-colonial
thought. Other authors considered as figureheads of post-colonial thought are Kwame
Nkrumah and Frantz Fanon. The authors included in this piece-Antony Anghie, Makau
wa Mutua, and Mahmood Mamdani-fall under the philosophical branch of post-colonial
critique. Mamdani and Anghie have provided political angles on the philosophical
critiques. Mutua is one of the first scholars to apply the post-colonialist critique to
international law.
7. In the cases discussed, I will avoid discussion of issues pertaining to maritime
disputes. This decision has been made because maritime law is an unique field that may
touch upon the issues discussed in this paper, but does so in a way that is tangentially
related to utipossidetisjuris.
As for discussing the relationship between uti possidetisjuris and democracy, this
line of argument is heavily influence by Mahmood Mamdani's work, who questioned
whether a post-colonial state's structures are conducive to democracy. See infra note 42.
8. See Hasani, supra note 3 at 86.
9. See Steven R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetisand The Borders of
New States, 90 AM. J. INT'L. L. 590, 594 [hereinafter Ratner]. Similar problems occurred
in post-colonial Asia. See generally Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thail.) 1962 I.C.J. 6 (June 15) [hereinafter Temple ofPreah Vihear].
10. See Hasani, supra note 3 at 87.
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provided for non-interference by each party in the sphere of interest of
the other."
These spheres ultimately evolved into administrative

boundaries as colonial powers further secured control over their
respective territories.' 2
But these boundaries were rarely clear
delineations-rather, they often marked protectorates, neutral and buffer
zones, and suzerainties that had been set up to reflect "spheres of
influence."' 3 Moreover, these lines were often determined primarily with
regard to latitude and longitude, and with little knowledge of the
topography of the terrain, geographic or demographic.
These boundaries, although problematic and often not necessarily
clearly delineated between colonial powers, were adopted by postcolonial African nation-states as borders. This adoption was officially
affirmed in the Cairo Declaration, a declaration by the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) that the borders of Africa reflect a "tangible
reality," and that all leaders of Africa were committed to respect the
borders existing at the time of independence. 14 This declaration
continues to uphold modem African borders, and has been adopted by
the OAU's newest reorganization as the African Union. 15 Border
disputes continue today, but uti possidetisjuris has become the basis for
border disputes, while claims on ethnic, historic, or other entitlements do
not have much standing.16
Overall, the historical strength of the precedent of uti possidetis
juris has laid in its simplicity of application. The vagueness of
negotiated boundaries in theory became clearly delineated black lines,
and in turn, former colonies became nation-states. 17 But the weakness of
the precedent also lay in the simplicity of the application-beyond
longitude and latitude, boundaries negotiated were not representative of
demographic or geographic realities. Nonetheless, according to the

11.

See MALCOLM SHAw, TITLE TO TERRITORY INAFRICA 48 (1986).

12.
13.
14.

See id.
See Hasani, supra note 3 at 88.
"The view at the time was that Africa needed to settle down." Paul Reynolds,

African Union Replaces Dictators' Club, BBC News World Edition, July 8, 2002,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2115736.stm.
As will be seen later on, the other
problem is that self-determination as currently defined under international law, does not
include a right to secession. See infra note 22.
15. See Reynolds, supra note 14.
16. See Hasani, supra note 3 at 88.
17. Hasani quotes Jeffery Herbst, who argues "borders are always artificial because
states are not natural creations." For this reason, Herbst argues, it is important to judge
borders "on the basis of their usefulness to those who created them[,]" and not on
demographic, ethnographic, or topographic criteria. On his basis, Herbst believes
African boundaries are not arbitrary. See id. at 94, quoting Jeffrey Herbst, The Creation
and Maintenance of NationalBoundaries in Africa, INTERNATIONAL ORG. 43(4) (Autumn

1989) 692.
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precedent of its application under international law, uti possidetis juris
remains the underpinning of borders-and in turn, modem nationstates-throughout much of the modem world.
B.

Uti Possidetis Juris under InternationalLaw

Uti possidetis juris is a concept with uncertain foundations in
international law. It is unclear whether it is a principle or rule of
international law, or whether it is customary international law, so it is
neither a fundamental tenet nor a reliable source of guidance.18 It
circumscribes the identity of the post-colonial state, but has been
criticized for imposing identities on the various inhabitants of former
colonies. It has established international borders, but often has left the
location of these borders ambiguous.1 9 It has been applied in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America, but the international legal justifications for its
application have been whittled away by theorists over time, to a point
where perhaps it can only be justified as the last wall between chaos and
order in the post-colonial world.2 ° Conceptually, then, there is some
justification for uti possidetisjuris to be considered a principle or a rule
of international law, or part of customary international law, but not
much.
Instead, uti possidetis juris may be best understood as a freefloating idea of limited application, linked to international law only via
the principle/right 2 of self-determination, tenuous though this link may
be. It is, by definition, linked to self-determination. 22 It was intended to
18. See Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Republic of Mali) 1986
I.C.J 554, 566-67 (Dec. 22) [hereinafter FrontierDispute (Faso v. Mali)]. Steven R.
Ratner argues that there is some support for the proposition that utipossidetisjurisshould
be considered part of customary law, despite a lack of an affirmative proclamation of the
I.C.J. Ratner, supra note 9 at 598. However, he concedes that there is a "less than rock
solid" basis for it to be considered a customary norm and surmises that utipossidetisjuris
may have been "no more than a policy decision adopted to avoid conflicts during
decolonization. Id. Perhaps the problem with defining utipossidetis is most evident in S.
AKWEENDA, NAMIBIA: A CASE STUDY (1997), where uti possidetis is referred to as a
"principle," a "doctrine," and a "rule" alternately. See AKWEENDA at 47-48. For this
reason, and for the explicatory purposes of this paper, I will refer to uti possidetis as
either a concept or an idea.
19. See AKWEENDA, supra note 18 at 47.
20. See Ratner, supra note 9 at 617 ("any solution other than acceptance of past
injustices would be too complicated to be applied, would lead to chaos, and would
therefore prove illegitimate.").
21. Malcom Shaw refers to self-determination as a legal right under international
law, but also as a principle. See SHAW, supra note 11 at 92-93. It is unclear how a
Positivist conception of international law would define uti possidetis juris. It has been
applied, but it is on its way out, as this paper seeks to prove.
22. See FrontierDispute (Faso v. Mali), supra note 18. By "self-determination," I
mean both internal self-determination, which enables the people of a country to make

2006]

ECONOMIC AND COOPERATIVE POST-COLONIAL BORDERS

213

be a form of self-determination for the polities of post-colonial states,
who would be defined by the borders that had been established by their
former rulers. 23 However, it was a version of self-determination where
the self-the polity and the identity of the polity-had been predetermined by an outside power using randomly drawn borders.2 4 Thus,

important political or constitutional decisions, and "[e]xtemal self-determination[, which]
enables the population of a territory to decide freely whether to join, or not, an existing
state, or whether to become an independent and sovereign state.... Both external and
internal self-determination imply a democratic process...."
YVES BEIGBEDER,
INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF PLEBISCITES, REFERENDA AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS:
SELF-DETERMINATION AND TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY 18 (1994). The closeness of the

link between self-determination and democracy will not be explored in this paper.
Rather, it is assumed that there is a close link, and that it is sufficient for the sake of this
argument that such a link exists. However, I recognize that a polity exercising selfdetermination may not necessarily choose a democratic government. It is also assumed
that self-determination is part ofjus cogens, and of legal significance in international law.
See, e.g., Jochen A. Frowein, Self-Determination as a Limit to Obligations Under
InternationalLaw, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 218 (Christian Tomuschat

ed., 1993). See also, SHAW, supra note 11 at 93; Western Sahara, Advisory Op., I.C.J.
12, 33 (Oct. 16) (self-determination is "the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will
of peoples").
23. Ratner argues,
The juxtaposition of uti possidetis and self-determination began in Latin
America, where the Creoles who wrested independence from their Spanish
brethren beginning in the early nineteenth century seized upon the idea as a
way of setting boundaries of the new countries. Scorned by the peninsulares,
the new Americans in the Latin American bureaucracy had formed political
allegiances to the administrative units in which they were raised and assigned
for their jobs, rather than to Spanish America writ large.
Ratner, supra note 9 at 593. Decolonization in Africa occurred along colonial borders
because it as "the most feasible method for speedy decolonization." Id. at 595. Uti
possidetisjuriswas the implicit basis for this approach, ultimately referred to in principle
but not by name in the Cairo Declaration of the Organization of African Unity in 1963
with a pledge to "respect the frontiers existing on [the] achievement of independence" by
African states. Id. Similar declarations may be found in Articles 11(l)(c) and Article III
of the Charter of the O.A.U. The new Charter of the African Union preserves the same
language.
24. Malcolm Shaw writes,
the emphasis upon the necessity of maintaining colonial frontiers clearly
demonstrated by the overwhelming majority of Afro-Asian and South
American States can be understood in terms of the necessity of establishing
stable legitimacy factors. But this has meant a general freezing of territorial
entities as at the eve of decolonization and a consequent disregard for ethnic
and historical ties which cross the old colonial border, or at least a
minimization of their importance in territorial terms. Accordingly, the
principle of self-determination has operated in practice to safeguard the
colonial delimitations and overrule purely ethnic definitions of the "self," so
that the "self'; must be determined within the colonial territorial context.
SHAW, supra note 11 at 93. This also was the position of Pan-Africanists at the time of
decolonization. Pan-Africanists, like Makau wa Mutua, argued that a "wholesale
restructuring of borders" was necessary "to rectify past injustices." Ratner, supra note 9
at 595.
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there currently exists a tenuous link between uti possidetisjurisand selfdetermination.2 5
An attenuating factor in this relationship is the argument that uti
possidetis juris "has become discredited as a criterion for settling
26
boundary disputes, as it has proved to be indefinite and ambiguous.
The borders it has internationalized have often been unclear, either for
historical reasons or because colonial powers left them undefined. The
treaties establishing them may not have been ratified, the boundaries
were drawn on imprecise maps, the location of some boundaries were
left unclear, or because despite the existence of an agreement neither the
original powers nor the post-colonial states have chosen to adhere to
those borders.27 The result has been an international identity, and
consequently a definition of self, for post-colonial states that can be
uncertain, constantly changing, and/or oft-disputed.
This relationship is further attenuated by the fact that selfdetermination does not include a right to secession.28 Nor does uti
possidetis, on its own, allow for secession. 29 Therefore, post-colonial

25. The Badinter Commission, oft-criticized for the conclusions it reached on the
application of uti possidetis juris in post-dissolution Yugoslavia, concluded that
"whatever the circumstances, the right to self-determination must not involve changes to
existing frontiers at that time of independence (uti possidetis juris) except where the
states concerned agree otherwise." Opinion No. 2., EJIL 3 (1992) at 183-84, as cited in
Jochen A. Frowein, Self-Determination as a Limit to Obligations Under International
Law, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 216-17 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993).
This conclusion has been critiqued as the application of uti possidetis without any
underlying justification. Frowein at 217.
26. See AKWEENDA, supra note 18 at 48.
27. These particular problems will be seen in the cases to be discussed in this paper.
28. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States defines a state in
§ 201 as "an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent population, under the
control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in,
formal relations with other such entities." However, according to comment d. to § 202,
[e]ven when an entity appears to satisfy the requirements of § 201, other states
may refuse to treat it as a state when circumstances warrant doubt that it will
continue to satisfy the requirements of statehood-for example, where the new
entity is attempting to secede from another state which continues to resist the
secession.
An act of secession is not necessarily a recognized act of self-determination. Put
differently, self-determination does not necessarily permit secession, and therefore does
not include a right to self-determination. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law of the U. S. §§ 201-202, and cmt. d at § 202 (A.L.I. 1987).
29. The Roman root of uti possidetis is a form of Praetorian edict that would
"preserve, pending litigation, an existing state of possession of an immovable."
AKWEENDA, supra note 18 at 47. It has continued to have a preservative purpose in its
subsequent application. Secession has never been an aim or an application of the
concept, with the exception of the work of the Badinter Commission, which has been
discredited. See supra note 6. See also para. 6 of Resolution 1514 (XV); the 1970
Declaration of Principles (2625(XXV)).
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identity has been formed by self-determination but not by secession.3 ° In
other words, the limitations of self-determination under customary
international law are inhered by utipossidetisjuris.
Some certainty in this link remains, largely due to dictum of the
I.C.J. in the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v.
Republic of Mali) to clarify utipossidetisjuris. The I.C.J. has labeled uti
possidetisjuris "not a special rule," but "a general principle, which is
logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of
independence, wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the
independence and stability of new States being endangered by fratricidal
struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the
withdrawal of the administering power. 3 1 This conceptualization of uti
possidetis juris lays out a logical connection with self-determination,
uncertain only because of the Court's unwillingness to label uti
possidetis juris a principle or a rule. 32 This holding is currently
considered the guiding conceptualization of uti possidetis juris in
international law.
Given the above, where does uti possidetisjuris stand now? Uti
possidetis juris should be conceived as a concept with limited
justification for the post-colonial state. This is primarily because its
relationship with self-determination is much weaker than its definition
would suggest. It is also unclear whether acts of self-determination are
feasible within a post-colonial nation-state. Somewhat confusingly, selfdetermination preserves borders as they are by preventing secession, but
in preventing secession, does not permit potentially necessary remedies
to disputed or poorly drawn borders. Last, as a nebulous concept, it has
preserved more debate than it has clarity. As post-colonial nation-states
evolve, an uncertain foundation for determining borders can be a recipe
for chaos and dispute, as the cases before the I.C.J. have demonstrated.
For these reasons, it should be reconsidered as a basis for preserving the
integrity of the post-colonial nation-state.

30. This is not generally true. Namibia achieved independence in 1990 from South
Africa. Similarly, North Cameroon and South Cameroon became Cameroon and part of
Nigeria, respectively. But these have really been the only exceptions to the application of
uti possidetis in Africa, which "yield[ed] the most international frontiers of any continent
relative to its area. Ratner, supra note 9 at 596.
31. FrontierDispute (Faso v. Mali), supra note 18 at 565. But even as a principle,
the Court refuses to show that uti possidetis juris is "a firmly established principle of
international law where decolonization is concerned," thus leaving open the questions of
whether as a principle utipossidetisjuris is firmly established, and of whether it is only a
principle as to decolonization and not applicable to other areas of international law. Id.
32. More importantly, dictum in FrontierDispute (Faso v. Mali) lays out a much
more apparent, tangible link with preservation of order and stability. However, the ruling
does little to clarify the status of utipossidetisjurisin international law.

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:1

C. External and InternalAttacks on "AdministrativeBorders"
A particularly vulnerable area of uti possidetisjuris is the concept
of administrative borders upon which it rests. The meaning of
"administrative borders" has varied in context. 33 In colonial Latin
America, "boundaries were derived from various sorts of Spanish
governmental instruments setting up hierarchical and other units," or
from borders established by treaty between Spain and Portugal.3 4 In
Africa, borders were derived initially from spheres of influence,
arrangements between colonial powers that provided for non-interference
by each party in the sphere of interest of the other, but ultimately evolved
into administrative boundaries as colonial powers further secured control
over their respective territories.35
From these two historical precedents, it may be argued that there is
an internal and external aspect to administrative borders of former
colonial states.36 Internally, the borders corresponded to the internal
administration of a polity by a former colonial power. Externally,
borders represented an identity created by foreign powers that were
integral to geopolitical and regional peace. Uti possidetisjuristhus rests
upon the assumption that the former colonial administrative borders were
representative of a political identity and preserved stability and territorial
integrity.37
Post-colonial theorists have attacked both the internal and the
external aspects of post-colonial borders. The external attack argues that
borders signify an imposed identity on the polity, and therefore no
33. Malcom Shaw confirms this reading of post-colonial borders as administrative in
the colonial sense, and hence identity confined to within these borders.
The current situation would appear to be that, as a legal right, selfdetermination as leading to modifications in the international status of a
territory applies only to an accepted non-self-governing territorial situation.
All groups may be entitled to self-determination in the sense of fully
participating within the internal constitutional structure of a particular State, but
they will not thereby acquire a right under international law to selfdetermination in the former sense.... The people-territory dialectic may
open the way in the future of modifications to the basic principle, but that is yet
to come.
SHAw, supra note 11 at 104.
34. See Ratner, supra note 9 at 594. Similar problems occurred in post-colonial
Asia. See generally Temple of Preah Vihear, supra note 9.
35. SHAw, supra note 11 at 48.
36. This article, in its prior form as an essay for a seminar, was written prior to
Enver Hasani's publication of his Article. Therefore, it is coincidental that I make this
distinction between scholarly attacks on uti possidetisjuris as internal and external, and
that Prof. Hasani defines scholarly approaches to defining the real causes behind the
emergence and acceptance of the uti possidetis juris principle as "internal" and
"external." See Hasani, supra note 3 at 89.
37. Ratner, supra note 9 at 591.
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connection exists between administrative borders and the polity of the
post-colonial state. 38 Both Antony Anghie and Makau wa Mutua have
laid out external attacks, but each author has a distinctly different
approach. Anghie argues that sovereignty is a European concept,
imposed on the colonies and protectorates of the colonial era, and foreign
to the non-Western world.39 Uti possidetis juris and sovereignty are
concepts that were imposed on the colonial polity, and should not be
inherited by the post-colonial polity.40 Mutua attacks statehood itself,
labeling it "false statehood," and disassociating the term "nation-state"
from post-colonial African identity.4 1
The internal attack targets the title "administrative" of
administrative borders, arguing that the remnant social, political, and
economic structure of the post-colonial governance has created obstacles
to democracy. In other words, it is not the post-colonial borders that are
the problem; it is the colonial administrative legacy within those borders
that is impeding the modem African state.42 Mahmood Mamdani has
posited this attack, arguing that post-colonial borders embody a self, but
whether the self may be able to democratize will depend on rectifying the

38. Frontiers had been a foreign concept before European colonization, as "frontiers
were zones through which one clan or tribe passed from one region to another; and any
borders depended solely on who would be paid tribute. When European powers drew
borders, they did so "with only slight knowledge of or regard for local inhabitants or
geography," instead making allocations "to reduce armed conflict among themselves."
See id. at 595.
We have been engaged... in drawing lines upon maps where no white man's
feet have ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes
to each other, but we have only been hindered by the small impediment that we
never knew exactly where those mountains and rivers and lakes were.
Lord Salisbury, as quoted by Judge Adjibola in his Separate Opinion, Territorial Dispute
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) 1990 I.C.J. (Feb. 13) at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
icases/idt/idt-ijudgments/idt-ijudgment_19940203_separateAjibola.pdf (at section 8).
39. See generally, Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and
Colonialism in Nineteenth Century InternationalLaw, 40 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 1 (1999);
Antony Anghie, FranciscoDe Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of InternationalLaw, in
5:3 SOCIAL AND LEGAL STUDIES 321, 321-323, 331-333 (1996).
40. Id. Anghie paints with a broader brush than Mutua: Anghie attacks Asian,
African, and Latin American post-colonial identity, whereas Mutua focuses solely on
Africa. But the underlying argument for both is the same: the polity created by colonial
administrative borders is not a self for the purposes of self-determination, nor is it
conducive to democratization.
41. Mutua also attacks the identity of the post-colonial polity, labeling it "a
contrived and artificial citizenry[.]" Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa:
A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113, 1142-45 (1995).
42. MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY AFRICA AND THE
LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM (Sherry B. Omer, Nicholas B. Dirks & Geoff Eley eds.,
1996). This is an Africa-specific argument and will be applied only to Cameroon v.
Nigeria and Botswana v. Namibia.
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imbalance of political power between urban and rural.4 3
These attacks will provide a lens by which to analyze the
consequences of these decisions to the relationship between uti possidetis
juris and democracy. This paper will look at three particular disputes
that have been brought to the I.C.J.-Qatarv. Bahrain,44 Botswana v.
Namibia,45 and Cameroon v. Nigeria46-- where the court has been
confronted with new interpretations of borders.47 In each case, the Court
has upheld the borders as they were at independence, but has departed
from the idea of administrative borders in each decision. These
departures suggest, both implicitly and explicitly, two alternate
interpretations of post-colonial borders.
The first interpretation is of borders as representative of the
economic interests of the state. 48 Economic interests physically manifest
as oil, 49 tourism, 5° and fishing, 5' but also have a temporal dimension
where such interests represent past,52 present 53 and future54 economic
interests. The second interpretation is of borders as international
cooperative arrangements. I will consider these interpretations in light of
the attacks of the post-colonialist theorists. I will suggest that these

43. Id. at 18.
44. Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar
and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.) 2001 I.C.J. 40 (March 16) [hereinafter Qatar v. Bahr.].
45. Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots./Namib.) 1999 I.C.J. 1045 (Dec.
13) [hereinafter Bots./Namib.].
46. Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and
Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.; Eq. Guinea intervening) 2002 I.C.J. 303 (Oct. 10)
[hereinafter Cameroon v. Nig.].
47. There is a fourth case that was decided in the past year--Case Concerning the
Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger) 2005 I.C.J. (July 12) [hereinafter Frontier Dispute
(Benin/Niger)], http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ibn/ibnframe.htm.
This was
regarding a disputed border between Benin and Niger along the Niger River, and who
owned title to the islands along the river border. The Court applied uti possidetisjurisin
its decision. I do not include this decision because unlike the other three decisions,
neither party presented a new interpretation of its borders in its arguments. Rather, the
dispute involved more technical aspects of the application of uti possidetis juris,
particularly whether the Court must turn to effectivit~s (evidence of title "in order to
complete or make good doubtful or absent legal titles, but can never prevail over titles
with which they are at variance.") to determine the border. I also do not include the
decision because there is no discussion within the case, or dissent attached, about the
colonial practices surrounding the creation of the border.
48. Economic disputes over borders are not a new phenomenon. See SHAW, supra
note 12 at 195-96 ("Although economic reasons have underlain a number of territorial
claims, direct economic claims have been very rare.").
49. See generally Cameroon v. Nig., supra note 46; Qatarv. Bahr., supra note 44.
50. Qatarv. Bahr., supra note 44.
51. Cameroon v. Nig., supra note 46.
52. Qatarv. Bahr., supra note 44.
53. Bots./Namib., supra note 45.
54. Cameroon v. Nig., supra note 46.
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interpretations may have further attenuated the relationship between uti
possidetisjuris and self-determination, perhaps to the extent where there
may no longer be any basis upon which to posit the existence of such a
relationship.
In Section II, I will establish the foundations of these two
interpretations in Qatar v. Bahrain.5 5 In Section III, I will explore the
first interpretation as it is may be found in Botswana v. Namibia and
Cameroon v. Nigeria. In Section IV, I will explore the second
interpretation as it is discussed in the Botswana decision, and how it is
briefly explored in the Cameroon decision. In Section V, I will use the
theoretical attacks above as means of analyzing the effect of these
interpretations on uti possidetisjuris alone and on the relationship of uti
possidetis juris to self-determination and democracy. In Section VI, I
will utilize the summary of the results of my analysis to paint an overall
sense of whether the concept of uti possidetisjuris should be entirely
discarded.
II.

The Hawar Islands Dispute

The most explicit manifestation of the two alternate interpretations
of administrative borders is the I.C.J.'s decision regarding the Hawar
Islands in Qatar v. Bahrain.6 The Hawar Islands lie within 3 to 12
nautical miles of the coast of Qatar, 57 but were unofficially given to
Bahrain by the British Political Agent in 1936, a decision officially
affirmed by the British government in 193958 Qatar had objected to the
decision since 1939, claiming that it had not been informed of the British
55. Chronologically, the Court ruled on Bots./Namib. two years before Qatar v.
Bahr. I choose to use Qatar v. Bahr. as the basis for my argument because it is the most
explicit manifestation of the two interpretations. Concededly, this order also reflects the
logical development of my thesis.
56. There are two additional elements of this case involving border delimitation: the
maritime delimitation of the Qatar-Bahrain border, and the dispute over Janan Island, one
of the Hawar Islands. The Janan Island dispute is interesting because it relies on the
same 1939 decision as the Hawar Islands, but has an outcome favorable to Qatar.
Bahrain challenges this ruling based on language in a letter by the same Political Agent
who originally determined the Hawar Islands to be in Bahrain's possession for reasons to
be discussed infra. See Qatarv. Bahr., supra note 44 at 90. Moreover, the Court relies
on subsequent letters from the British Government to the Rulers of Qatar and Bahrain in
1947 to affirm their conclusion. But, as will be seen below, the Court does not rely upon
a subsequent British Foreign Office Memo that establishes Qatar to have had original title
to the Hawar Islands. See id. The decision by the Court as to Janan Island suggests that
the Court was seeking to avoid any ruling that would have awarded the Hawar Islands to
Qatar.
57. Id. at 70.
58. Concededly, Qatar challenges this title of Protectorate, but in all likelihood to
avoid the Court upholding the British decision as an arbitral decision or as an
administrative decision. Id. at 73.
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decision of 1936, nor had it consented to it. 59 The I.C.J. intervened at the
request of both parties, which have been in dispute over the islands since
the 1939 award.
The Court ruled in favor of Bahrain, holding the British award as
6
has having had legal effect and therefore as binding on both parties. 0
Fundamental to its decision was the conclusion that despite the existence
of treaties with the British Commonwealth for both nation-states dating
back to the eighteenth century, as well as evidence that the British
Foreign Agent may have been directly involved in the decision to award
the Hawar Islands to Bahrain, neither Qatar nor Bahrain was ever a
Protectorate of the British Empire.
The issue of whether both nation-states had been Protectorates prior
raises two uncertainties in the case, which the dissent targets. First, there
is the historical uncertainty of Qatar and Bahrain's geographic and
political identities from the eighteenth century on-first under the
Ottoman Empire, and subsequently as independent Sheikdoms with
treaties of Protection with the British Commonwealth. The multi-faceted
history of these states constructed by the Court provides little foundation
to pinpoint as to whether these states were independent before 197061 or
if they could have ever been considered Protectorates of the British
Empire.6 2
Second, given the uncertainty of the identities of these states, it is
unclear as to how the Hawar Island border between them should be
conceptualized. If Qatar and Bahrain were Protectorates of the British
Commonwealth, then the border should be conceived of as a former
administrative boundary of the British Commonwealth. In this case, uti
possidetis juris would apply, and the British Government's decision in
1939 would be considered an administrative decision. But if it was a
border dispute between two independent countries resolved by a third
party, uti possidetisjurisby definition cannot apply.
The dissent attempts to address both uncertainties by offering two
alternate interpretations of post-colonial borders as a means of
resolution: first, as the economic interest of the former colonial power,
and second, borders as a cooperative arrangement between countries. As
59. Id. at 59-60.
60. Qatarv. Bahr., supra note 44 at 85.
61. Great Britain's Treaties of Protection with Qatar and Bahrain were officially
ended in 1971. See id. at 62.
62. The majority substantially focus on the details of both Qatar's and Bahrain's
post-Ottoman history, and both countries' identities established via their Treaties with
Great Britain. Within this history, Qatar's status develops from Bahraini rule to
independence to Ottoman rule and then ultimately to independence secured by a Treaty
with Great Britain. Bahrain's status is portrayed as that of an independent state whose
security is ensured by Great Britain. See generally id. at 55-58.
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will be seen below, the majority is implicitly cognizant of these
arguments, and chooses to avoid them. Nevertheless, in having done so,
it recognizes their existence.

A.

Post-ColonialBorders as the Economic Interests of the Former
ColonialPower

The dissent regards the decision of the British Government to award
the Hawar Islands to Bahrain as an economic decision made for political
reasons, and hence, "of questionable legal value." 63 The dissent relies
upon evidence that states the British motives in awarding the islands to
Bahrain in 1936 were to secure maximum oil concessions. This motive
is suggested but not addressed in the Court's opinion, which chooses to
avoid discussion of the relevant evidence. 64
The dissent focuses on a confidential British memorandum that
Great Britain had considered the Hawar Islands part of Qatar until 1936,
but changed its consideration based on "the local policy of certain British
representatives and the rush for oil with the advent of off-shore
exploration., 65 The dissent presents the Ruler of Bahrain as having
needed more concessions to fulfill a promise to the British, and so he laid
claim to the Hawar Islands.66 In response, the British Political
Resident-who in 1933 had stated "Hawar Island is clearly not one" of
Bahrain's group-in 1936 agreed with the British Political Agent's
assessment that "it might suit us politically to have as large an area as
possible included under Bahrain.' '67 It was this decision that underlay the
original 1936 British recognition of Bahraini sovereignty over the Hawar
Islands, and which then underlay the 1939 British award of the islands to
Bahrain.6 8
The dissent's construction of events is interesting when looking at
the concept of administrativeborders. First, the British Political Agent's
decision to recognize the Hawar Islands as belonging to Bahrain has the
63. See id. at 154 (joint dissenting opinion).
64. Id. at 155 note 8. In the Court's decision, it briefly lays out a series of
communications between the British Political Agent, the Adviser to the Government of
Bahrain, and Petroleum Concessions Ltd. regarding ownership of the Hawar Islands.
65.

Qatar v. Bahr., supra note 44 at 155 note 9. The "confidential letter" is from

1964, but explicitly confirms the motives that appear to have been determinative of the
original 1936 award of the Hawar Islands to Bahrain.
66. Id. at 155 (joint dissenting opinion).
67. Id. at 155-56. For an understanding of this relationship, see 2001 I.L.M. at para.
38: "[r]epresentation of British interests in the region was entrusted to a British Political
Resident in the Gulf, installed in Bushire (Persia), to whom British Political Agents were
subsequently subordinated in various sheikhdoms with which Great Britain had
concluded agreements." Id. at 54.
68. Id. at 156 (joint dissenting opinion).
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appearance and substance of an administrative decision by the British
regarding the border between two of its Protectorates. This is suggested
in the majority's opinion, but the dissent explicitly cites this decision as
having been determinative of the border.69
Second, the dissent explicitly suggests the impetus behind this
award was purely economic. There was a political element to this
decision as well, as the British Political Agent perceived this award to
Bahrain as important to Bahraini-British relations. 70 But the political
was an outgrowth of the economic, as the decision was made by the
British for the purpose of securing offshore oil concessions. Great
Britain appears to have been seeking to maximize its oil concessions
from the region, particularly from Bahrain, and secretly adjusted the
border accordingly.
These two elements, when combined, suggest the Hawar Islands
border was an administrative border between two British Protectorates,
but established upon economic considerations solely and not upon the
administration of the polity. It is for this reason that the dissent is
unwilling to use uti possidetis juris as "relevant title" for the "real
motives underlying the legal contrivance which was the British decision
of 1939, directly inspired as it was by rival oil interests."71 Thus, the
dissent suggests that not only may the Hawar Islands border have been
founded upon the economic interests of the British, but that such a
determination is objectionable and a "contrivance."
B. Borders as Representinga CooperativeArrangementBetween
Countries
The second interpretation of borders, borders as representing a
cooperative arrangement between countries, is suggested by the dissent
as an alternate solution to the dispute. It is proposed at the conclusion of
the dissent's analysis of the claim of effectivits by Bahrain which the
69. Bahrain argued that the decision was an arbitral award, which the Court holds
the award was not. The Court attempts to then prove that the British Government had
been an independent third party asked to administer the dispute. But the Court also cites
a series of treaties which show to the contrary that Britain had agreements of exclusive
protection with both parties. The implications of these agreements will be discussed
more below. See infra Part II.C
70. See MAMDANI, supra note 42.
71. Qatar v. Bahr., supra note 44 (joint dissenting opinion) at 214. Also lurking in
the background of this ruling is the fact that the Hawar Islands may still have large oil
reserves for both states to take advantage of. Such a fact, if true, would also present the
Hawar Islands border as representing a present economic interest of both sides. But there
is little evidence of oil concession works on the island. The dissent notes a lack of
evidence of civilian works on the islands. Id. at 172. Nonetheless, a similar interest
presents itself in Bots./Namib. See infra Part III
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majority chose not to explore.72 Effectivit~s, as defined by the I.C.J. in
Frontier Dispute (Faso v. Mali), are administrative activities that
demonstrate jurisdiction over territory.73 The dissent refutes Bahrain's
claim, writing that Qatar's persistence in refusing to acquiesce quietly to
Bahrain's claim to the islands prevented effectivits 7 4 But, the dissent
concedes, given the majority's decision to base its ruling in the 1939
British award, perhaps the islands should be shared between the two
parties."

The dissent notes that this proposed solution mirrors the principle of
condominia, which is a principle of international law.76 Condominia is a
cooperative arrangement over territory; however, there seems to be
additional justification for this proposal. One such justification appears
to be the dissent's desire to rectify a perceptibly unjust decision. It
recognizes the significance of the Hawar Islands to both sides, and is
ultimately disturbed by the motives behind the British award and the
1936 decision not to inform Qatar. But the dissent also recognizes that
the British decision cannot be reversed for the same reasons.77 The
dissent concludes, "[i]t is more essential than ever that judicial settlement
fulfill to the utmost its calming, peace-making function in a case such as
being unjustly despoiled by a Judgment
this, where each Party fears
' 78
depriving it of the Hawars.
The dissent also empathizes with the sentiments of the polities of
each country. The dissent envisions Bahrain's loss of the Hawars as "a
truly alienating capitis diminutio... the loss of a vestige of bygone
72. Qatarv. Bahr., supra note 44 (joint dissenting opinion) at 167-72.
73. Effectivitrs frequently include deed registration, tax collection, and licensing of
professions. See FrontierDispute (Fasov. Mali), supra note 18 at 586.
74. Qatar v. Bahr., supra note 44 (joint dissenting opinion) at 168.
75. Id.
76. Id. Brownlie explains that "[i]nternational law recognizes the condominium,
which exists when two or more states exercise sovereignty conjointly over a territory."
See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 113-14 (6th ed., 2003).
He adds, "[wiorthy of comment is the fact that the theoretical consequences of this type
of regime may be qualified by agreement. Moreover, national legislation and jurisdiction
will not automatically extend to territory under the special regime of condominium. On
occasion it has been suggested that in certain cases, for example with reference to landlocked lakes and bays bounded by the territory of two or more states, the riparian states
have condominium over the area by the operation of law. This is doubtful, but it is
possible for the regime to arise by prescription." Id. at 113 (references omitted).
77. Id. at 150. The dissent characterizes the British decision of 1936 as having had
"fraudulent intent," and thus believes that the 1939 decision could not reverse that
decision, as it asks, "[h]ow, in these circumstances, could the United Kingdom
commence in May 1938 a procedure under which it acted as if it had never taken any
prior decision?" Id. at 160. The dissent compares this situation to Article 17 of the
Statute of the Court, which "prohibits any Member of the Court from hearing a case if he
had already dealt with it in the past in any capacity." Id.
78. BROWNLIE at 150.
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splendor.... Hawar is Bahrain's 'Alsace-Lorraine.,, 79 As for Qatar,
the loss of, or failure to recover, the Hawars... would give rise to a
sense of disappointment as intense as its confidence in international
justice was great. At the end of every day for 61 years now, each and
every Qatari
sees his lost illusions swept away on the waves of the
80
daily ebb.

The dissent appears to believe a cooperative border remedies the
loss of identity that a loss of territory entails. In other words, the dissent
idealizes a cooperative border as a means recapturing of lost identity for
a polity.
The dissent thus bases a cooperative arrangement on three grounds:
condominia, the sentiments of the polities, and the dissent's desire to
rectify a perceptibly unjust decision. All three suggest a concern for the
polities of both states in this proposition, but they are ultimately abstract.
The international legal grounds are unclear-condominia is an actual
international legal principle, but it is not directly proposed as a solution.
The grounds of empathy may be considered to be genuine or diplomatic
gesture by the court in attempt to craft a just solution to a perceived
historical injustice, but again, is not a clear-cut solution. Last, the
interpretation of a cooperative border is rooted in the identity of the
polity, but this relationship is tenuous as it is unclear where one polity
begins and the other ends, either historically or administratively.
Thus, in exploring the gray areas between the administrations of
two separate nation-states, the dissent has not rooted its bases for a
cooperative border in any practical administrative considerations.
Therefore, neither can this conception of a cooperative border be rooted
in practical considerations, and instead may be best considered to be an
attractive alternative in the abstract.
C. The Dissent'sInterpretationsReflected in the Court's Opinion
The two interpretations of the dissent are present in the majority's
decision in its handling of Qatar and Bahrain's historical status and in its
choice not to address utipossidetisjuris.
Fundamental to the majority's opinion is the conclusion that neither
Qatar nor Bahrain were ever Protectorates of the British Commonwealth.
It bases this opinion on an Exclusive Protection Agreement of 13 March
1892 between the Sheikh of Bahrain and the British Political Resident in
the Gulf and an exclusive agreement between Great Britain and Qatar
dated 3 November 1916 that, for all intensive purposes, rendered Qatar a
79.
80.

Id. at 149-50 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 150.
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Protectorate of Great Britain. 8 1 But these treaties seem to indicate that
Qatar and Bahrain were Protectorates of the British Commonwealth.8 2
Yet the majority does not label either state as former "Protectorates"
or "protected States." 83 Moreover, it is unclear in the majority's decision
what the appropriate label for their colonial status should be. The
decision suggests both states were either post-Ottoman independent
nation-states, or Protectorates of the British Commonwealth. But in
having done so, the Court rules out the application of uti possidetisjuris
altogether; instead, the implication appears to be that each party was an.
81. Qatarv. Bahr., supra note 44 (joint dissenting opinion) at 56, 57.
82. This is concededly an arguable conclusion as to the status of Qatar and Bahrain
under the British Commonwealth. Different sources provide different answers to the
question of what defines a Protectorate. Before the I.C.J., Qatar contends that neither
Bahrain nor Qatar was ever a Protectorate; rather than address the assertion, the majority
avoids this issue in its decision. Brownlie does not provide a clear answer as a reference
either, saying only,
the dominant partner, state A, has acquired a significant role in the government
of state B, and particularly in the taking of executive decisions relating to the
conduct of foreign affairs. The legal aspects of the relationship will vary with
the circumstances of each case, and not too much can be deduced from the
terminology of the relevant instruments. It may be that the protected
community or "state" is a part of state A and, as a colonial protectorate, has no
international legal personality, although for purposes of internal law it will have
a special status.
BROWNLIE at 114. Based on Brownlie's example, both Qatar and Bahrain could be
defined as former Protectorates. A more clear definition of Qatar's and Bahrain's status
at the time comes from Owen Hood Phillips, who writes that within the British
Commonwealth, it was
possible to draw a distinction between (i) those territories in which the Crown
exercises an effective sovereignty without actual annexation, and (ii) those in
which the administration is carried on by and in the name of the native
sovereign with British advice.
The former may be called, "Colonial
Protectorates" and the latter "Protected States."
0. HOOD PHILLIPS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF GREAT BRITAIN AND THE
COMMONWEALTH (1952). Hood characterizes Bahrain and Qatar as "British Protected
States, but are dealt with administratively through the Foreign Office; internationally,
they are in the same position as the Protected States ...with which the Colonial Office is
concerned." Hence, the conclusion that can best be drawn from these two external
sources, Brownlie and Hood, is that Bahrain and Qatar were considered Protectorates
under Commonwealth law, and thus should be characterized as such.
As Hood's description depicts Protectorates as equivalent in Commonwealth status
to colonies, there exists a strong argument that uti possidetis juris should apply here.
Why the Court does not explore uti possidetis is discussed subsequently.
83. Interestingly, though the dissent conveys both Qatar and Bahrain as having been
Protectorates, it also refuses to label both states as such. Rather the dissent states that,
the "special relationship of protection" between the United Kingdom and the
two States parties to the present dispute gave rise to a flexible division,
evolving over time, of responsibilities between the protecting Power and the
protected State, as a result of which the State retained its personality; this was
not the case for most countries in Africa.
Qatar v. Bahr., supra note 44 (joint dissenting opinion) at 214.
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independent state at the time. 4 Thus, it seems that it is implicitly true
that both states were Protectorates,
but explicitly, the Court carefully
85
avoids not stating or defining this.

Having made this definitional decision, the Court appears to avoid
the implications suggested by the dissent. Nevertheless, the concepts of
uti possidetis juris and "administrative borders" manifest in the case,
largely because of the formula presented by Bahrain and agreed to by
both parties. The "Bahraini formula" permits the Court to "embrace[] all
questions relating to the Hawar Islands, including the dispute concerning
the 1939 British decision. 86 Under this formula, both Qatar and Bahrain
confront the court with arguments based on uti possidetis juris, original
title, and effectivit~s as questions for the Court to address.
Despite this significant leeway, the Court does not address these
arguments, rather relying solely on the 1939 decision. 87 The advantage
of such an approach, it appears, is that there is some certainty to a
decision made by a previous colonial administrator, as in disputes
involving borders established by uti possidetis juris.88 Additional
certainty may be found in the relationship between the British
Commonwealth and the Rulers of Qatar and Bahrain found in Protection
Agreements since 1886. But as the Court refuses to characterize either
state as a former Protectorate, and the decision as an administrative
84. This approach to uti possidetis juris by the Court is somewhat evident in its
strategy for the ruling. The majority focuses on the nature and validity of the 1939
decision, rather than the three other legal issues it perceived to exist in the case: the
existence of an original title to the islands for either side; effectivitrs; and, whether
Bahrain's defense of uti possidetisjuris was applicable to this dispute. All three issues
all touch upon both uti possidetis juris and the traditional assumption of administrative
borders,but the Court ultimately addresses none of them. Id. at 75.
85. Ultimately, then, neither a concrete conceptualization of borders nor a ruling on
the application of uti possidetis juris to this matter may be found in the majority's
decision. Rather, it seems that the Court simply regards the states as they are todayindependent members of the international community. The Court appears to create the
fiction that Qatar and Bahrain were independent Sheikhdoms who sought out the opinion
of the British Government as an independent third party. This is most evident where the
majority writes,
the 1939 decision is not an arbitral award.... This does not, however, mean
that it was devoid of all legal effect. Quite to the contrary, the pleadings, and in
particular the Exchange of Letters referred to above..., show that Bahrain and
Qatar consented to the British Government settling their dispute over the
Hawar Islands. The 1939 decision must therefore be regarded as a decision that
was binding from the outset on both States and continued to be binding on
those same States after 1971, when they ceased to be British protected States.
Id. at 83.
86. Id. at 77; id. (joint dissenting opinion) at 163.
87. Qatarv. Bahr., supra note 44 at 85.
88. In other words, the certainty created by a ruling of original title in border
disputes between former colonies when such an analysis may be applied, is still feasibly
reached via an alternate route.
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decision, these arguments are not recognized, but lurk within the decision
nonetheless.
But the Court also seems to implicitly recognize the 1936 decision
was a fundamentally economic one. It recognizes the communications
that led to the decision were tied to the "negotiations then in progress for
the grant of an oil concession.' 8 9 However, it does not address the
decision itself at all, except to say it stands, 90 and rather focuses only on
the 1939 decision. Moreover, the Court's recitation of the facts suggests
that the British Political Resident and British Political Agent both
engaged in roles resembling an administrator more than a diplomat.
Some indication of this point is evident in the fact that the Resident had
to refer back to the India Office-the heart of Britain's colonial empire
in the region-for an opinion on the matter.9 1 Most indicative of this
point is the failure of either the Agent or the Resident to contact Qatar
regarding this decision.
Were the issue of uti possidetis juris not present or had there not
been Protectorate treaties in existence, perhaps the 1936 decision could
have been regarded as an unfortunately unfair decision by the British
Government. It appears this is the angle that the majority hoped to adopt
by ruling that the 1939 decision stands because both Bahrain and Qatar
consented to it. 92 But because both issues are recognized in this case, the
Court recognizes a border determination by the administrators of a
colonial power was solely for economic purposes, and not for the polity,
and chooses to uphold that border nonetheless. The Court thus appears
unwilling to undermine the fundamental assumption of uti possidetis
juris that colonial borders were necessarily administrative.
It is for similar reasons that the Court does not reconcile either
party's claims with the dissent's proposal for a cooperative arrangement.
Were the Court to do so, it would have to overrule that the 1939 decision
was not binding on either side. Moreover, it appears that any grounds
other than the 1939 decision would suggest that the Hawar Islands were
originally Qatar's until 1936. Last, it would be forced to recognize the
economic rationale behind the border and then would have to redefine it.
Such a decision would undermine uti possidetisjurisentirely, though the
ironic result would be a border more associated with the polities of both
states than as it currently stands. Therefore, the Court cannot create a
cooperative arrangement like condominia as a solution to the dispute, as
it is a highly problematic path from a variety of angles.9 3
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 58-59.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 83-84.
An interesting question raised by this problem is whether the Court would
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Interestingly, it is also important to note that by dismissing the
effectivit~s angle, the Court dismisses a means of resolving the dispute
that is entirely congruent with the definition of uti possidetisjuris. That
is, the permission granted to the Dawasir to settle the Hawar Islands by
the Sheikh of Bahrain in the eighteenth century, and the sworn allegiance
of the Dawasir to the Sheikh of Bahrain, not only constituted effectivits,
as Bahrain argues, but also a part of the Bahrain self, which is the
implicit argument. 94 Again, the Court avoids this argument. 95 In doing
so, the Court directly avoids out the grounds of self-determination for
applying utipossidetisjuris. This choice also appears congruent with its
approach to avoiding the term protectorate-anyangle of argument that
follows the logic of an act of self-determination would imply that both
countries had been protectorates. But as the Court seeks to avoid this
line of argument altogether, as there can be no act of self-determination
congruent with the decisions of the British Foreign Agent. If there were,
then both Qatar and Bahrain were Protectorates, and uti possidetisjuris
applies.
It thus appears that the majority carefully avoids grounds of uti
possidetis juris as a basis for its decision, as it implicitly would
acknowledge that the basis for the border was historically an economic
interest of the British.
III. The African Border Disputes
In post-colonial African nation-states, post-colonial identity is
predicated on uti possidetisjuris. Border disputes still remain, but often
target the ambiguities of the histories of colonial borders. A recent form
of dispute has been one that arises because of current or future economic
interests.
Whereas Qatar v. Bahrain implicitly dealt with uti possidetisjuris
and economic interests in a border dispute, two recent African border
disputes before the I.C.J. explicitly address the matter: in Cameroon v.
Nigeria regarding the Bakassi Peninsula and Lake Chad regions, and in
Botswana v. Namibia regarding Kasikili/Sedudu Island in the Chobe
River. Both the parties to the dispute and the Court appear to regard the
disputed borders as economic, but from a different temporal and
conceptual angle than the Court did in Qatar v. Bahrain. As will be
evident below, despite these subtle differences, the Court appears to be

impose such an arrangement as a solution to the dispute. It apparently has before, but in
the context of maritime borders. There are multiple economic and political implications
of such an arrangement, but those will not be explored in this Article.
94. Qatarv. Bahr., supra note 44 at 71.
95. Concededly, this decision is not entirely surprising.

2006]

ECONOMIC AND COOPERATIVE POST-COLONIAL BORDERS

229

uncomfortable with any conception of borders as representing the
economic interests of the state.
A.

Botswana v. Namibia (Kasikili/Sedudu Island)

Namibia and Botswana sought I.C.J. intervention in a dispute over
the title to Kasikili/Sedudu Island in the Chobe River, which lies north of
Botswana and South of Namibia. The island, about 1.5 square miles in
area, creates a fork in the river before it meets with the Zambezi,
resulting in a northern channel bordering Namibia and a southern
channel bordering Botswana.9 6 Botswana's Chobe National Park, a
protected wildlife reserve, lies directly south of the island. To the north
in Namibia lies a flood plain known as the "Caprivi Strip." 97 The closest
Namibian village is across the river from the island, whereas the closest
village in Botswana is 1.5km downstream. 98
There is no question as to the post-independence status of either
Namibia or Botswana-both were former colonies whose borders have
been internationalized via uti possidetisjuris. Nor is there any question
as that the border had been a colonial-era administrative border-the
island formed part of the demarcation of the spheres of influence
between Germany and Great Britain in Southwest Africa, embodied in
the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890. 99 Additionally, there is no
contention as to whether the treaty is binding on either party-both
acknowledge that they are bound by the 1890 Agreement. 00 Thus,
according to these three international legal standards, it is arguably
indisputable to conclude the border was an administrative border for both
Germany and Great Britain.
The similarity to the Qatar v. Bahrain dispute lies in the border
itself, established by a colonial power largely for economic reasons-in
this case the "transportation of commerce." But whereas in that dispute
the Court had been asked to overturn a border determination that had
been predicated on economic interests, here the Court has been asked to
resolve a border dispute that is predicated on an economic interest of
both parties. The economic interest is tourism, which for Botswana's
96. Bots./Namib., supra note 45 at 1053.
97. Id. at 1054.
98. Id. at 1057, Sketch-Map No, 3. The closest village in Namibia is Kasane, which
lies inland on the northwestern bank of Chobe, and the closest village in Botswana is
Kasika, which lies 1.5km downstream from the island.
99. Id. at 1059.
100. Id. Interestingly, under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23
May 1969, neither party would be considered a party to the original agreement as neither
was a signatory to it. However, in addition to the express consent of the parties, the
Court cites the OAU's Cairo Resolution and customary international law as bases for this
treaty to apply to both Botswana and Namibia. Bots./Namib., supra note 45 at 1059.
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economy is one of its "key sectors," and where Chobe National Park is
an integral attraction.''
Namibia, on the other hand, is heavily
dependent on the minerals industry; tourism is not even considered a key
source of income. 0 2 But
it does possess a tourist industry, and has an
03
interest in developing it.1
Again, the Court shows discomfort with recognizing economic
interests as determinative of a post-colonial state border, whereas the
dissent's explicitly regards economic interests as the determinative
factor. Justice Weeramantry writes: "[a]s Namibia informed the Court
at the oral hearings, tens of thousands of tourists from all over the world
come to Namibia to visit its game parks[.]"' 0 4 He notes additionally,
"[t]he use of the southern channel to observe the wildlife on
Kasikili/Sedudu Island would be a natural and important part of the
agenda of the tourists in both countries."' 1 5 But Weeramantry is most
101. See Botswana Tourism, Chobe National Park, http://www.botswanatourism.gov.bw/attractions/choben.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
102. Id.
103. Bots./Namib. (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry) at 1177. An interesting
perspective on the growing importance of the tourist industry to both parties may be
found in Joseph R. Berger's article. He writes:
Although the "buffalo fence" is not electric and is broken by elephants, the
Botswana wildlife authorities use problem animal control techniques-scaring
elephants with firecracker-type devices, shooting them if necessary-to try to
keep them from crossing the fence on a regular basis (lions that jump over the
fence are likewise a problem). To the north, the elephant population spreads
through Namibia's Caprivi strip, then thins into war-tom Angola. To the north
and east, it also spreads into Zambia and Zimbabwe. When I visited Botswana
in December 1999, I was informed by a local naturalist about a decision of the
International Court of Justice handed down days earlier, settling a decades old
dispute between Botswana and Namibia over Sedudu Island in the Chobe
River, which forms their border, awarding sovereignty over the island to
Botswana. See Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island [Bots./Namib.], Dec.
13, 1999, 39 LL.M. 310. I passed the island, and it appeared an empty
grassland. But during the dry season (which is the southern hemisphere
winter), the island teems with elephants, buffalo and other wildlife. Although
wildlife was not a historical basis for the dispute, wildlife has made the island
more valuable to both Botswana and Namibia, as tourism in the area has
increased rapidly. Elephant populations frequently straddle international
borders, and while this often causes disputes, particularly over ivory poaching,
it may also from the basis for international cooperation, under the right
circumstances.
Joseph R. Berger, The African Elephant, Human Economies, and InternationalLaw: A
GreatRift for East and Southern Africa, 13 GEO. INT'L ENVTL L. REv. 417, 436 note 106.
104. Bots./Namib.(dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry), supra note 46 at 1178.
Namibia appears to have subtly attempted to convey the importance of wildlife to its
tourist industry in its arguments regarding which channel should be considered the main
channel. It did so by introducing evidence consisting of photographs of "a herd of
elephants crossing the two channels of the Chobe[.]" The Court took note of this
evidence, but found it unconvincing. See id. at 1066.
105. Id. at 1178.
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sensitive to Botswana's interests in a favorable ruling: "[t]he principal
loss and inconvenience to Botswana would not be in regard to
navigation, but in regard to the tourism and preservation of wildlife
which would ensue from the fact that the teeming wildlife on the
that the
Botswana side has habitually crossed over to the Island and
06
Island is in a sense an integral part of this wildlife preserve."'
The Court, on the other hand, only recognizes the importance of
tourism to both countries when it notes the "economic importance" of
"the use of the southern channel by flat-bottomed tourist boats."' 0 7 It
instead explicitly rests the decision upon its interpretation of thalweg,
which the Court states may mean: "'the most suitable channel for
navigation' on the river, 'the line determined by the line of deepest
soundings,' or 'the median line of the main channel followed by boatmen
travelling downstream."",10 8 All three meanings laid out by the Court
suggest an inherent commercial meaning to thalweg.'0 9
But unlike Qatarv. Bahrain, the Court is comfortable with this fact.
The border was established on thalweg, but also stood as an
administrative division between the spheres of influence. Therefore, the

106. Id. Interestingly, Weeramantry does not regard this factor as grounds for an
economic interpretation of borders, but rather as grounds for an interpretation of the
border as a cooperative arrangement for the purpose of ecological protection. See infra
Part IV.A.
107. Id. at 1071. However, the Court refuses to use this as a basis for establishing the
border as the southern channel, despite Namibia's argument in favor of such an
interpretation.
108. Bots./Namib., supra note 45 at 1061-62. Akweenda offers an alternative way of
stating these three different meanings. For Akweenda, thalweg marks the line which
connects the deepest points in the river; the line which connects the deepest points in a
channel; or the centre of the normal principal navigation channel. See AKWEENDA, supra
note 18 at 56. For the purposes of this paper, however, I will follow the Court's
definition, as its use of the terms "navigation" and "boatmen" inhere a more commercial
meaning to the term thalweg. Additionally, how thalweg is translated in the English
version of the treaty is a non-issue in the case. See Bots./Namib., supra note 45 at 1062.
109. Also, when determining navigability of the watercourses, it notes "Those
conditions [of varying navigability] can prevent the use of the watercourse in question by
large vessels carrying substantial cargoes, but permit light flat-bottomed vessels[.]" See
id. at 1071. The point here is that rather than focusing solely on the technical meaning of
thalweg, the Court additionally focuses on the commercial implications of the proper
interpretation of this term. Moreover, the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 was very
much a commercial treaty-it was signed by the British to protect north-south trade
routes in south-west Africa, and by Germany to secure British recognition of its access to
the Zambezi. Id. at 1054.
Hence, the problem with thalweg in this dispute is that the dividing line between the
spheres of influence between Great Britain and Germany was agreed to be upon the
"main channel" of the Chobe River and it is unclear whether the agreed main channel
was the northern channel or the southern channel. The Court rules, based on three
different surveys conducted between 1912 and 1985, that the northern channel is the main
channel. Id. at 1072.
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Court resolves the ambiguity underlying thalweg, but is unwilling to do
otherwise.
The alternate ground for a holding was to have ruled in favor of a
party based on the significance of the island to that party. However,
given the descriptions of the island presented by both parties, this island
and border has little use for either party, except for the tourist industry.
Namibia argues that the Masubians, who inhabit the Caprivi Strip in
Kasika village, have had "continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted"
occupation of the island, "in so far as the physical conditions of the
Island allowed[.]""10 Namibia portrays the Masubians as moving "in
accordance with the dictates of the annual flood.""' Botswana, on the
other hand, portrays the island as an occasional habitat for wildlife, to
which Justice Weeramantry further adds: "[it is] a place where they meet
and feed and breed.""' 2 Moreover, "[t]he grazing on the island ' is
13
excellent and there is a daily elephant migration to the island." "
Namibia thus claims occupation of the island when there is no flooding,
but recognizes the importance of the island to wildlife, whereas
Botswana claims the significance of the island is only for wildlife.
Therefore, the Court does not have much ground for a decision
based on the importance of the island to any particular interest of either
side, except for tourism and thalweg. The Court appears to rest the
decision on thalweg, and thus the former colonial administrative borders,
because to do so otherwise would be to determine a border based on the
current economic interests of the state." 4 As was suggested in the
analysis of the Qatar v. Bahrain decision above, the Court appears
uncomfortable with this latter course.
Nonetheless, the Court's
110. Bots./Namib., supra note 45 at 1093. This argument is part of Namibia's broader
argument of prescriptive title to the island, which claims that this behavior of the
Masubia "constituted a key component of the system of 'indirect rule' which prevailed in
the region." Id. The Court dismisses this first ground for two different reasons. First, it
does not see any evidence that the Masubians occupied the island i titre de souverain,but
rather for their own needs, primarily agricultural but also in response to the flood season.
Second, Botswana's predecessors never acquiesced to Caprivi claims of the border's
location in the southern channel, and moreover, treated the issue of the Masubia as
independent from the border issue. Id. at 1105-06. The Court additionally dismisses
Namibia's argument by pointing out that it was not "uncommon for the inhabitants of
border regions in Africa to traverse such borders for purposes of agriculture and grazing,
without raising concern on the part of the authorities on either side of the border." Id. at
1094.
111. Bots. v. Namib., supra note 45 at 1093.
112. Id. at 1181 (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry).
113. Id., (citing Counter-Memorial of Namibia, vol. III, p.34, para. 11.9). In other
words, this is a point that Botswana argued and Namibia reaffirmed.
114. I will suggest below that this decision takes into account the environmental
concerns of Weeramantry because it awards the island to the country with the best
resources and experiences in the tourist industry to protect wildlife. See infra Part IV.A.
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avoidance of the issue, especially in light of the facts presented by Judge
Weeramantry's dissent opinion, suggests that the Court still recognizes a
border may represent economic interests for a state. However, it will not
rule that such interests may be or have been determinative of that border.
B.

Cameroon v. Nigeria

The border dispute in Cameroon v. Nigeria mirrors the cases
discussed above in the sense that a disputed border represents an
economic interest of the state. Unlike the others, however, the disputed
border represents a future economic interest of the parties to the dispute.
Nigeria's and Cameroon's borders rest upon the spheres of
influence established by a series of treaties between Germany, France,
and Great Britain between 1906 and 1913.115 The boundary of the
Bakassi Peninsula specifically rests upon a Treaty of Protection between
Great Britain and the local Kings and Chiefs of the region (known as Old
Calabar) from 1886, but also two subsequent agreements reached
between Great Britain and Germany in 1913 that established the
1 16
"Frontier between Nigeria and the Cameroons, from Yola to the Sea."
The Lake Chad border was created by the Milner-Simon Declaration of
1919, and clarified in subsequent agreements between the French and
British during their period of control by Mandate of the region.' 17 This
border has also been subsequently clarified by the work of the Lake Chad
Basin Commission. 18 Thus, the roots of both the Lake Chad and
Bakassi Peninsula borders are geopolitical arrangements, and have been
internationalized by uti possidetisjuris. Neither border was established
on necessarily economic or administrative grounds.' 19
There are three elements to the disagreement over these particular
borders. As in the other two disputes discussed in this paper, these
115. Cameroon v. Nig., supra note 46 at 331. The history of the identities of the two
nations isactually quite complicated, largely as a consequence of the division of
Germany's territories between France and Great Britain under the Treaty of Versailles.
As the Court does not delve into this history for an answer, neither will I. However, there
will be some reference to this history in understanding the Court's approach to the
Bakassi Peninsula.
116. Id. at 333. This agreement placed the Bakassi Peninsula in German territory, and
therefore in modem-day Nigeria.
117. Id. at 344. This region did not have any border delimitations or demarcations
derived from spheres of influence, and thus had been left open under most pre World War
I agreements. Additionally, the Court turns to the work of the Lake Chad Basin
Commission ("LCBC"), established in 1964 and given, among other tasks, the task of
dealing with certain boundary and security issues.
118. Seeid. at351.
119. There isdiscussion of demarcation versus delimitation, but as this is a related
argument not integral to the decision, I will not explore it. See Cameroon v. Nig., supra
note 46 at 334-35. See also id. (dissenting opinion of Ajibola) at 542-43.
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borders represent economic interests.
The Lake Chad border, a
settlement for Nigerian fishermen, 120 represents a current economic
interest of Nigeria, and the Bakassi Peninsula represents a future
alternative to the Persian Gulf as a major supplier of oil to the US and
other major importers. 2 ' Second, like the Kasikili/Sedudu Island and
Qatar v. Bahrain disputes, these borders are not necessarily defined by
the treaties above. 2 2 Last, like the Kasikili/Sedudu Island dispute, the
population of a party is involved, but to a much greater extent. There is a
significant Nigerian population in both regions--over 150,000 Nigerians
in the Bakassi Peninsula, 23 33 Nigerian villages settled in the disputed
125
Lake Chad territory, 124 and over three million Nigerians in Cameroon.
Nigeria's arguments thus confront the Court with a novel problem: it has
an economic and legal rationale for disputing these territories, but the
unprecedented additional rationale that Nigerians inhabit those
territories.
The Court holds for both the Bakassi Peninsula and Lake Chad that
the borders were established by the agreements cited above and thus
cannot be altered as Nigeria seeks to alter them.126 Although these
holdings are not based upon uti possidetis juris, they follow the same
rationale. Yet the presence of Nigerian villages governed by the
Nigerian government in the Lake Chad region, and of Nigerians in the
Bakassi Peninsula, suggests that the Court's decision to uphold the
border may be too simple a solution.
This is first evident in the Court's decision as to Lake Chad.
Nigeria argues that the Lake Chad region is a historically undefined
territory, and the historical consolidation of the region by Nigerians is a
consequence of this ambiguity. 27 The Court rejects these arguments,
120. See id. at 330.
121. See "U.N. ruling Favors Cameroon," Anthony Deutsch AP Online, 10/10/02.
122. Nigeria claims as to the Lake Chad region that a subsequent agreement to the
Milner-Simon Declaration (the Thomson-Marchand Declaration of 1929-30) did not
provide a final delimitation of the Anglo-French boundary in regard to Lake Chad. See
Cameroon v. Nig., supra note 46 at 334. The Court agrees to an extent, holding "the
Declaration does have some technical imperfections and that certain details remain to be
specified" but that the "Declaration provided for a delimitation that was sufficient in
general for demarcation." See id. at 341.
123. Id. (dissenting opinion of Ajibola) at 539.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. An additional argument was made by Cameroon that Nigeria was bound by the
work of the LCBC in the 1980s and 1990s in the demarcation of the border, but the Court
holds that Nigeria was not bound by that agreement. See Cameroon v. Nig., supra note
46 at 335-40.
127. Nigeria argues historical consolidation on three grounds: long occupation by
Nigeria and Nigerian nationals constituting historical consolidation of title; effective
administration by Nigeria, acting as sovereign and an absence of protest; and,
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instead holding that Cameroon had original title to the land.' 28 But the
Court recognizes this title as problematic in the treaties that had
established this border:
Despite the uncertainties in regard to the longitudinal reading of the
tripoint in Lake Chad and the location of the mouth of the Ebeji, and
while no demarcation had taken place in Lake Chad before the
independence of Nigeria and Cameroon, the Court is of the view
that.... certainly by 1931, the frontier in the Lake Chad
area was
29
indeed delimited and agreed by Great Britain and France.1

Moreover, it makes this decision despite the fact that the 33 villages have
been established on territory recently created by unprecedented
environmental conditions:
dried-up lakebed, islands perennially
surrounded by water, or on locations that are islands in the wet season
only 130
Last, the villages appear to have been established with
Cameroon's tacit consent-the existence of these villages had been
challenged only once by Cameroon before it filed suit in 1994.31 The
above factors suggest shaky evidence of original title to the region for
Cameroon, and novel issues underlying the settlement of Nigerians in the
region, but the Court still upholds the border as it was originally founded.
The Court takes a similar approach to the Bakassi Peninsula, where
the history of historical title is similarly problematic, and the territory's
inhabitants are Nigerian. Nigeria attempts to argue that there are
ambiguities in the transfer of title in the historical treaties.1 32 It argues
that the Treaty retained original title with the Kings and Chiefs of Old
Calabar, and because Bakassi was a protectorate, Great Britain did not
have the authority to give Bakassi to Germany in 1913.133 The Court
manifestations of sovereignty by Nigeria together with the acquiescence by Cameroon in
Nigerian sovereignty over Darak and the associated Lake Chad villages. See id. at 349.
128. The Court specifically holds that "there was no acquiescence by Cameroon in the
abandonment of its title in the area in favour of Nigeria. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that the situation was essentially one where the effectivitis adduced by Nigeria
did not correspond to the law," and cites FrontierDispute (Faso v. Mali) as grounds for
ruling in favor of Cameroon. See id. at 354-55.
129. Id. at 341.
130. Id. at 349. The dried up lake-bed presents a novel issue, as it is land newly
created by an environmental problem and an ambiguous border.
131. Cameroon v. Nig., supra note 46 at 349-50. Moreover, Nigeria points out that
Cameroon does not provide evidence as to the settlement of "a substantial number of
villages," thereby implying that Cameroon had implicitly allowed the settlement of those
villages in the past. The implicit suggestion is that Cameroon did not perceive these
settlements to be problematic until Nigeria's behavior became more aggressive along the
border.
132. Id. at 366. See also id. (Nigeria insists that the Agreement of 1913 was not put
into effect and was invalid because, among other things, Great Britain did not possess
title to the Bakassi).
133. See id. at 400.
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rejects both arguments, finding as to original title "no evidence of any
protest in 1913 by the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar[.]"' 3 4 Moreover,
the Court finds that the treaty may not have established an international
135
protectorate, but it confirmed "British administration by indirect rule.'
The Court thus rejects Nigeria's arguments that historical ambiguity may
open the door to a claim of title to this land, also.
Unlike the other cases discussed in this paper, it is not the dissent
136
who is aware of the questionable grounds of the Court's decision.
Rather, it is the Court itself, which rests original title to the region on a
Note Verbale of 1962 from Nigeria to Cameroon regarding oil licensing
blocks despite historical evidence that suggests otherwise. Although this
note explicitly states that Nigeria recognized Bakassi as having belonged
to Cameroon at one point in the 1960s, 137 it does little else to clarify
historical ambiguities surrounding the question of original title. The
Court also uses this evidence as grounds to refute the Nigeria's claim of
historical consolidation, 38 though Nigeria's arguments present a much
more complex relationship with the region, including the establishment
of health centers, community schools and the collection of tax from
Nigeria uses these arguments to claim historical
villages. 39
consolidation of the region since independence, claiming they
40
collectively constitute independent and self-sufficient title to Bakassi.1
had already been established
But the Court holds that Cameroonian title
41
in Bakassi, tenuous though title may be.'
Thus, with Cameroon's historically ambiguous title to the region,
134. Id. at 406-07.
135. Additionally, the Court cites historical evidence that the British did not refer to
Old Calabar in any British Orders of Council. See id. at 407. It appears that Old Calabar
ceased to exist as an international personality following this Treaty of Protection, but it
remained as a local one. When analyzed within the context of the internal attacks on
post-colonial borders, this will be significant. See infra Part V.B.
In an interesting twist, the Court cites Qatar v. Bahrain to support the proposition
that "a characteristic of an international protectorate is that of ongoing meetings and
discussions between the protecting Power and the Rulers of the Protectorate." Cameroon
v. Nig., supra note 46 at 407. But, as was evident above, the Court would not
characterize either Qatar or Bahrain a Protectorate or a protected state. This also suggests
that the Court is extremely careful with the language it uses with respect to post-colonial
borders for the purpose of reaching a particular conclusion.
136. There are two dissenting opinions in this case, Judge Ajibola's and Judge
Koroma's. Judge Ajibola agrees with Nigeria's arguments as to original title. See
generally id. (Ajibola dissent) at 547-52. Judge Oda's dissent in Bots./Namib. takes issue
with the specificity of the Court's delineation of the Lake Chad region. See Bots./Namib.
(separate opinion of Judge Oda), supranote 45 at 1116.
137. Cameroon v. Nig., supra note 46 at 410.
138. See id. at 411-12.
139. See id. at 413.
140. See id. at 412-13.
141. Id. at413-14.
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and Nigeria's administrative and representative presence in both the
Bakassi Peninsula and Lake Chad regions, there exist historical and
representative grounds for Nigeria's claim to the region. But the Court
does not accede to them, and it is explicitly unclear from the decision as
to why. But it is implicitly clear that the economic interests of Nigeria
both regions-agrarian in Lake Chad and oil concessions in Bakassisubstantially affected the Court. The Court appears most troubled by
Nigeria's intentions, 142 as Nigeria's acts constitute a naked challenge to
border stability, if not an attempt to revive terra nullius. The Court
seems troubled enough that it would rest much of its decision on a Note
Verbale, while spending much of its discussion avoiding the historical
uncertainties that plague the region. Moreover, it does so despite the
substantial Nigerian population present in Cameroon, specifically in the
disputed territories. Thus, the ruling may be best regarded as an explicit
rejection of Nigeria's treatment of post-colonial borders as terra nullius
for the sake of potential future economic interests. Put in alternate terms,
the Court is rejecting Nigeria's implicit interpretation of a border as a
future economic interest for a state. But, in having done so, it has also
rejected arguments for redrawing post-colonial borders for the interests
of the polity.
IV.

The Cooperative Border

The concept of borders as a cooperative agreement between two
nations is fundamental to the notion of borders themselves-that is, a
border marks the mutual recognition of defined territory between
states. 14 3 The idea of a border as a shared region between two nationstates is a concept that exists in international law.' 44 Such a concept is
indeed suggested by the dissent in Qatar v. Bahrain. But a border as a
cooperative arrangement for the sake of honoring both nation-states'
duties under an international agreement for the protection of the
environment appears to be unprecedented. 45 In such an instance, neither
state's identity is bound to its own polity, but rather to its duties to the

142. For the Lake Chad region, the Court cites Cameroon's argument that Nigeria's
border incursions at the Lake Chad region are "acts of conquest which cannot found a
valid territorial title under international law." Cameroon v. Nig., supra note 46 at 351.
Moreover, it is troubled enough to devote the last three pages of its decision to a
discussion of the deployments of force by both sides in the disputed regions. Id. at 450-

53.
143. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49
Stat. 3097, 165 U.N.T.S. 19.
144. This is perhaps derivative of the concept of "spheres of influence," but it should
also be considered that in the arbitration of Rann of Kutch, Pakistan and India were asked
to share a border. R. P. ANAND, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 223 (1969).

145.

This assertion is based on the author's research.
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international polity, if such a thing exists.
Such an approach is suggested by Judge Weeramantry in Botswana
v. Namibia as a potential solution to the dispute. Justice Weeramantry
suggests a joint regime for the island, whereby Namibia would be
awarded the island 146 but would be "obliged to negotiate with Botswana
towards a mutually acceptable joint regulatory regime[.],', 47 The
suggestion is based on his perception of a "tension between principles of
territorial sovereignty and principles of ecological protection which
involve a fiduciary responsibility towards the ecosystems of the States
Such a regime presents the possibility "for the
concerned., 148
concerns into boundary delimitation, and
environmental
incorporation of
of joint regimes for conserving the
with the development of the concept
149
common environmental heritage.'
As in Qatar v. Bahrain, a joint regime is suggested here as an
alternate solution. But Weeramantry seems to have taken this regime a
step further by suggesting that the identity of states should be
subordinate to a cooperative regime based on their international
obligations to international environmental law. Weeramantry's rationale
appears to be affected by an argument of Botswana:
if the Court were to rule in favour of Namibia, the decision would
immediately remove the Island from the range of the wildlife, as they
would be hunted down on the Island, as was done in the rest of the
Caprivi. Thus, in the interest of conservation, and for all the other
146. Weeramantry believes Namibia should be awarded the island primarily on the
grounds that the southern channel has been the primary channel for navigational use,
while ruling out the grounds of the majority's opinion. See generally, Bots./Namib.
(dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry), supra note 45 at 1165-79. He also regards
the use of the island by the Masubia as state sponsored, as colonial governments
"depended heavily on chiefly authority at a local level, and the claims and movements of
chieftains were not matters of indifference to them." Id. at 1164-65. This is an
interesting observation that will be discussed further in light of Mamdani's theory.
147. Id. at 1195.
148. Id. at 1179. He cites four grounds for his argument: his concern for a judiciallyimposed boundary delimitation that involves the dismantling or division of an
ecologically integral unit of biodiversity; the role of equity in delimitation; a distinction
between colonial treaties that indicated spheres of influence and those that designated
boundaries; and, "the notion of joint regimes over ecologically vital portions of territory
which, despite the ecological unity of the territory, straddle national borders." It is this
last ground that is most interesting, and thus this paper will focus on it. Id. at 1181.
149. Bots./Namib. (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry), supra note 45 at 1195.
The regime would cover such issues as: the protection of flora and fauna; the right of
access to the Island for citizens of both States; the regulation of tourist traffic; river
management and conservation; the licensing of river craft; the freedom of movement of
wildlife to and from the island; supervision by game wardens; permitted and prohibited
activities on the Island; the adoption of a common set of principles for the protection of
the natural resources of the area, including in particular the care and custody of wildlife.
See id. at 1194.
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reasons to be advanced by Botswana in this case.., the Court should
rule in favour of Botswana. By doing so, the Court would make a
clear statement
on conservation to all mankind, including
50
Namibians. 1
In particular, Weeramantry believes the obligations of both countries for
ecological conservation under the Biodiversity
Convention of 1992
15
justifies the creation of such a regime. 1
Furthermore, whereas the Qatar dissent did not have a particular
precedent or type of precedent in mind, Weeramantry does:
Joint management regimes have been established for the integrated
development of resources in river basins with States splitting costs
and responsibilities and sacrificing sovereignty as needed to facilitate
the management process. Many agreements have been worked out
for the joint management of continental shelf areas, and some with
many specific provisions relating 52to protection of the marine
environment and its flora and fauna.1
In addition, Weeramantry cites Article 123 of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, as a "legal framework for
cooperation," as it "obliges States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed
seas to co-operate
with each other, inter alia, over environmental
53
protection."1
This opinion seems to reflect the non-administrative aspect the
cooperative border suggested by Justice Weeramantry in Qatar v.
Bahrain. Weeramantry regards Masubian use as suggestive of title, but
not determinative. 54 But as to a cooperative border, there is no mention
of Masubian use as a rationale for this suggestion. Rather, like the
Hawar Islands, Weeramantry seems to suggest that there is a shared
identity to Kasikili/Sedudu Island, but an identity that shares both an
economic resource and a duty to an international regime.
Weeramantry's arguments appear to have influenced the final
outcome of this case. Above, Botswana raises the concern that Namibia
could not protect wildlife on the island from poachers. Given the
minimal role of the tourist industry in the Namibian economy, the
destitute condition of the economy relative to Botswana, and the absence
of a national game park in Namibia for the protection of wildlife, this is a
believable assertion. Namibia does not appear to have the experience,

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 1179 (citing Botswana's oral pleadings, CR 99/6, p.22).
Id. at 1191.
Id.
Bots./Namib. (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry), supra note 45 at 1191.
Id. at 1188.
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the ability, nor the resources to protect wildlife on this island. 155
Botswana, on the other hand, has all three. By awarding Kasikili/Sedudu
Island to Botswana, it may be inferred that the Court recognizes this is
the best solution for both countries to honor their obligations under the
UN Treaty on Ecology and the Treaty on the Environment.
Given that both parties have obligations under the Biodiversity
Convention, the Court perhaps recognizes that an award to Namibia
would prevent both parties from necessarily being able to satisfy their
obligations to this convention. An award to Botswana, on the other
hand, awards the island to the party with the resources, capability, and
developed tourist industry to protect the wildlife and its habitat.
Moreover, such a decision allows the Namibia to continue to develop its
tourist industry and the resources to protect wildlife crossing the Chobe.
The suggestion, then, is that economic considerations underlie the
Court's recognition of the international legal obligations of both parties.
It is also for these reasons that a cooperative award along the lines
of Judge Weeramantry's dissent is not yet feasible. It does not seem that
Namibia currently has the resources or is able to abide by its obligations
to this Convention. Perhaps in the future, as Namibia develops its tourist
economy, a cooperative arrangement at this border may be feasible.
However, it appears that the Court may have implicitly recognized Judge
Weeramantry's concern, and thus regards Botswana as the party more
able-economically and administratively-to abide by these obligations
to the Biodiversity Convention.
V.

External and Internal Attacks on the Post-Colonial State

The effect of these decisions on uti possidetis juris may be best
understood when framed against the internal and external attacks on
post-colonial state. The external attack on post-colonial state argues that
statehood is an imposed concept, and therefore post-colonial identity is a
false construct. The internal post-colonialist attack argues that the
administrative legacy has preserved inequalities from the colonial era,
and therefore that legacy must be addressed and reformed. Both
arguments ultimately regard uti possidetisjuris as a flawed legacy, but
from different angles.
A.

External Attack

The effects of external attack may be best understood by analyzing
it against two interpretations of borders that presented themselves in the
cases above: borders as the economic interests of the state, and borders
155.

This conclusion is inferred from information on the website. See supra note 101.
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as a cooperative arrangement between states. In the first case, a border
represents an economic interest only. In the second case, the border may
be cooperatively governed by both bordering states.
i.

Borders as the Economic Interests of the State

In the three cases analyzed above, it appears that the Court does not
believe there is a relation between the identity of the polity and the
borders of the state. There are three relationships suggested by an
economic interpretation of borders: pre-independence borders may not
have represented the polity (Qatar v. Bahrain); post-independence
borders may not currently represent the polity (Namibia v. Botswana;
Cameroon v. Nigeria); and post-independence borders must be altered to
represent the polity (Cameroon v. Nigeria).
15 6
The first proposition comes from Qatar v. Bahrain;
the Hawar
Islands border was established on the economic interests of Great
Britain. Moreover, the decision to establish that border was made
without the consent of the Sheikh of Qatar, and was finalized by Great
Britain. The self that was created upon independence in 1970 was an
artificially imposed self, whereas for Bahrain it was an artificially
created self. Therefore, Mutua and Anghie would argue, both the
international identity and the sovereignty of both Qatar and Bahrain as
defined by the Hawar Islands are false constructs. In other words, Qatar
v. Bahrain is proof of the pudding for the external attacks.
Put in alternate terms, the inherited border never represented the
polity. 157 The border did not represent a self, nor does it today.
Moreover, the inherited border was not necessarily an administrative
border at all, and rather, represented the interests of Great Britain. A preindependence border had been established primarily, if not only, for the
purpose of securing oil concessions for the British Commonwealth.
Anghie and Mutua would argue the Court has upheld an unjustly
established colonial-era border by ruling in favor of Bahrain.
Although uti possidetisjurisdoes not necessarily apply to Qatar and
Bahrain as post-commonwealth independent states, the implications to
the concept are present. There does seem to be in its application in this
decision an attenuated relationship between uti possidetisjuris and selfdetermination.
The Court inadvertently further attenuates this
156. The internal attack will not be addressed here, as Mamdani does not direct it at
the Middle East. Whether Mamdani's argument could apply to the former Protectorates
of the British Commonwealth in the Middle East is an interesting question, but will not
be explored here.
157. Then again, there is no mention of any population having been affected by the
British decision or by the Court's decision. Perhaps they are indirectly by having less oil
reserves, but whether this is necessarily so is unclear.
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relationship by refusing to base the grounds of its decision on effectivit~s.
Bahrain's arguments regarding the Dowasir were fundamental to this
rationale, along with a wide variety of other forms of argued effectivitis,
158
whereas Qatar was unable to produce similar evidence of effectivits.
Grounds that suggest a selfmay exist on the disputed territory are not a
factor in the Court's decision. 59 In avoiding these grounds of selfdetermination as a basis for territorial delineation, the Court
inadvertently finds another means to confirm the external attack that
post-colonial borders do not represent a self
The second proposition comes from both Namibia v. Botswana and
Cameroon v. Nigeria: disputed post-independence borders may
currently represent an economic interest of the post-colonial state. This
suggestion alone does not necessarily relate to the arguments of Mutua
and Anghie; however, both cases add in the complicating factor of
members of the polity inhabiting the disputed territories. Put in alternate
terms, then, a disputed territory traditionally inhabited by members of the
polity represents a current economic interest of the post-independence
state.
It is unclear what the external attack would argue as to a state
seeking to alter a border based on present economic interests. Although
the state is attempting to remedy an imposed identity, it is unclear
whether the state is seeking to remedy an injustice or to predatorily
accumulate resources at the expense of its neighbor.160 But Namibia
introduces the additional historical factor of Masubian habitation and
migration on Kasikili/Sedudu Island, and Nigeria introduces the
additional factors of Nigerian habitation on the Lake Chad and Bakassi
regions. Therefore, it could be argued that the state is seeking to remedy
an imposed post-colonial identity by seeking a more representative
border. In such a case, the external attack supports the states' arguments.
But as the implications of the economic motives of the state make such
an argument unwieldy, so does the suggestion that the external attack
supports such an argument. 16 1 Nevertheless, the external attack suggests
158. See Qatar v. Bahr., supra note 44 at 71. These effectivits include Bahraini
passports issued to residents of the Hawar islands and former Hawar Islands residents
who now live elsewhere in Bahrain.
159. Concededly, the grounds for self are arguably implicit in the Court's reliance on
the 1939 decision, which highlights the Dawasir's historical use of the Hawar Islands as
evidence of Bahraini occupation. See id. at 80-81. The point here, however, is that the
Court explicitly avoids utilizing either uti possidetis juris or self-determination as
grounds for this decision.
160. Given the tone of Anghie's and Mutua's pieces, it is doubtful they would view
the latter scenario as a justified remedy to the past injustices of colonial-era borders and
rule.
161. On the other hand, there is something to be said for a post-colonial state that is
seeking to improve its economic resources. Perhaps this is a sign of strengthening
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that to the extent that the border disputes are over the inhabitants in the
disputed regions, the disputes are indicative of an imposed identity. This
additionally makes it unclear whether Mutua and Anghie would
necessarily attack the Court's holdings that do not alter the borders as
unjust. 162
The third proposition comes from Cameroon v. Nigeria, where a
state seeks to alter its post-independence borders to represent the polity.
In other words, Nigeria's arguments for original title, specifically to the
Bakassi Peninsula, are arguments for an adjustment of a colonial border
for the interests of its polity. The Court's reasoning suggests that had
this proposition been presented by Nigeria without the implication of its
economic interests, then the external attack on post-colonial borders
would have been applied in an I.C.J. case in its purest form. But
arguments for original title and historical consolidation seem tainted by
the reality of the future oil prospects on the Bakassi Peninsula.
Assuming that this argument had been presented as the only grounds for
a decision by the Court, Mutua and Anghie would arguably support a
remedy that would rectify the border to be representative of the Nigerian
polity. As this argument presents the border as not representing the
polity, the border should be altered in favor of Nigeria's arguments. For
this reason, Mutua and Anghie would disagree with the Court's ruling,
perhaps even critiquing it for having failed to rectify a historical
falsehood.
Thus, in light of the external attack, the Court's three cases suggest
that the external attack has substantial grounds to argue that uti possidetis
juris does not reflect a self
ii.

Borders as a Cooperative Arrangement Between States

The alternative proposition comes from Qatar v. Bahrain and
Botswana v. Namibia, and it argues that a remedy to a post-colonial
border dispute is the establishment of a cooperative border. Put in the
terms of the external attack, the proposition states that the post-colonial
border is a lasting wound of the colonial era, and the best remedy is one
identity within the post-colonial borders. Then again, Mamdani's argument that the citybased central government exerts control over the pastoral areas of the state through
economic control of rural markets may also apply. In this light, a post-colonial state
exerting control over pastoral resources may in fact be a centralized, non-democratic
government further solidifying control.
162. This dilemma presents an interesting issue: should a state's borders be rectified
to represent the polity, despite the loss of an economic advantage to the other country?
This is an implicit issue in all three cases discussed above. The Dissent in Qatar v.
Bahrain suggests a financial payment from one side to the other. See Qatar v. Bahr.,
supra note 44 at 145 (joint dissenting opinion). But does a financial payment necessarily
rectify a flawed representation of the polity?
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that recognizes the interests of both affected parties. Interestingly, such
an argument is closest to Anghie's perspective, but may also reflect
Mutua's.
For Anghie, sovereignty and statehood are foreign concepts that
were imposed on the non-European world. 63 Any model of statehood
and/or borders that suggests that a region could be cooperatively
governed, and therefore transcend the identities of both states, could
thereby transcend the European model of statehood. Perhaps the same
conclusion could be reached for Mutua, but the answer is less clear, as
both states would still exist as states beyond the shared border.
Regardless, neither suggests that a border should be established in
international law for the sake of an international treaty or the particular
concerns of that treaty, as Weeramantry suggests. 164
However, a cooperative border may also be a return to pre-colonial
frontiers. For Anghie, a cooperative border may be a territory when
sophisticated forms of political and social organization may exist, but not
be a state. But for this to be acceptable, a polity must exist within this
cooperative region. Perhaps, then, Kasikili/Sedudu Island would provide
such an opportunity. But the Weeramantry's exclusion of Masubian use
of this island as a rationale for a cooperative regime suggests that an
alternative to sovereignty was not what he envisioned.
B. InternalAttack
Mahmood Mamdani argues that the administrative structure
preserved within the borders of the post-colonial state has preserved a
political and economic structure not conducive to democracy. 65 In
163.

See Anghie, 40 HARv. INT'L. L.J. 1 at 71.

164. It is unclear where either Mutua or Anghie would stand on this issue. Anghie
appears to be interested most in the mandate system and globalization. Mutua seems
most interested in deconstructing the post-colonial legacy. Neither seems to have
Cf Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Water
touched upon this interesting middle ground.
Management in the 21st Century, in LEGAL VISIONS OF THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF JUDGE CHRISTOPHER WEERAMANTRY 428-36 (Antony Anghie & Garry

Sturgess, eds., 1998).
165. The model was a single model of customary authority in precolonial Africa.
That model was monarchical, patriarchal, and authoritarian. It presumed a king
at the center of every polity, a chief on every piece of administrative ground,
and a patriarch in every homestead or kraal. Whether in the homestead, the
village, or the kingdom, authority was considered an attributed of personal
despotism.
MAMDANI, supra note 42 at 39.

Decentralized despotism is Mamdani's term for this

structure of the post-colonial state, (id at 145) a divided world where "on one side free
peasants closeted in separate ethnic containers, each with a customary [legal] shell
guarded over by a Native Authority, on the other a civil society bounded by the modem
(The Native Authority was the
See id at 61.
laws of the modem state ....
administrative entity for the nonsettler parts of the colonies. See id. at 21-22.) This
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particular, a legacy of central government control over rural markets and
economies, particularly the pastoral economy, has imposed restrictions
on traditional agrarian life in post-colonial African states. This model
has also concentrated non-agrarian power in the central government. 166
Through this model, the internal attack suggests that both an economic
interpretation of borders and a cooperative interpretation of borders may
further disassociate uti possidetisjuris from, and from being conducive
to, democracy.
The Court's holdings in the Botswana and Nigerian disputes uphold
167
the borders as they were established under uti possidetis juris.
Because Kasikili/Sedudu Island border represents the economic interest
of tourism for both Botswana and Namibia, but also represents an
agrarian economic interest for the Masubian people, the internal attack
suggests three different aspects to this decision. First, the holding in
favor of Botswana further restricts the Masubian's pastoral culture,
already circumscribed by colonial-era borders. 168 Second, Mamdani's
argument suggests that a decision in favor of Botswana's tourist industry
may reinforce a history in Botswana of redrawing borders in favor of the
state's interests over those of the pastoral farmer. 169 Third, Namibia's
arguments suggest that were it to have been awarded Kasikili/Sedudu
Island, the importance of the award would not have been for the
Masubian people but for the development of its own tourist industry. All
three angles suggest that the interests of the rural economy are or would
be undermined by the economic interests of the state in the region, as
paralleled in the dichotomy inherited by the post-colonial state. For
structure created a dual-faceted problem in post-colonial Africa-states that preserved
decentralized despotism, and states that created a much more centralized model. Id. at
170. The problem, Mamdani argues, is that at efforts to reform one form ultimately
results in the other. MAMDANI, supra note 42 at 291.
166. Mamdani only implicitly attacks borders as having imposed fixed borders and
identities on a pastoral culture where "[m]obility was the precondition not only for the
optimal utilization of resources, but also for their optimal conservation." Id. at 166. The
result of these borders is the exacerbation of ethnic divisions, as tribes were allotted
counties within borders. Therefore, Mamdani argues that decentralized despotism
exacerbates ethnic tensions. Additionally, he argues the alternative, centralized
despotism, exacerbates the urban-rural division by establishing power within the city
centers. The result he describes as a seesaw effect-centralization resolves the ethnic
tensions created by decentralization, but decentralization resolves the divide between
urban and rural created by centralization. Id. at 291.
167. Again, the internal attack does not apply to the Middle East, so it will not be
discussed in this context.
168. See id. at 165-66. It is unclear from Mamdani how environmental issues would
factor into his argument.
169. Mamdani writes, "[iun Botswana it is estimated that if one added together the
land set aside for commercial ranching, national parks, and game reserves (and the newly
proposed Wildlife Management Areas), the sum would amount to 41 percent of
Botswana's total land area!" Id. at 322 note 77.
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Mamdani, such a result would only reinforce the inherited structures that
are not conducive to democracy.
The disputes over the Lake Chad and Bakassi regions present
arguments that entangle state economic interests with the interests of the
polity. These interests play out in the Court's decision in a way that both
reinforces and undermines the internal attack. The decision reinforces
Mamdani's model by upholding a border that has divided the Nigerian
peoples in the Bakassi region, and that does not recognize the migratory
settlements of Nigerian peoples in the Lake Chad region.1 70 In other
words, the Court's decision that there must be a reversion to the norm
only reinforces the inherited flaws of the post-colonial state. However,
the Court also undermines the attack by not allowing a state to
predatorily consolidate its oil interests, which to Mamdani would be
prioritizing a colonial economic legacy over the traditional rural
economy. 1 7' Either way, the Court's holdings and Nigeria's arguments
suggest an incompatibility with an economic conception of post-colonial
borders and democracy.
As for the suggestion that a border may be cooperatively
administered, a cooperative region as a border would have two opposite
effects, depending on its application by the Court. A cooperative border
could merely extend the flaws of two post-colonial states to a region.
But if a polity inhabits this region, perhaps Mamdani would regard
cooperative governance as a return to pre-colonial inhabitance.1 72 In
such circumstances, though, the regime would be one where the local
customs would govern beyond either state, and perhaps ultimately,
within itself. Perhaps this would mark a return to freely moving peoples
in the region, now constrained by colonial era administrative
boundaries. 173
Thus, the internal attack suggests indirectly that uti possidetisjuris
has preserved structures internal to the state that are incompatible to self170. As settlements in both regions had the support of the Nigerian state, it is unclear
whether Mamdani would consider this a positive development. The positive spin would
be the state recognizes the migratory history of peoples in the region, and rather than
delineate it as in the past, it supports it. On the other hand, the permission of migratory
behavior amongst rural areas was characteristic of the indirect rule paradigm. See e.g.
MAMDANI, supra note 42 at 41.
171. This is true as long as oil is considered the priority of the state, and less the
priority of the local residents.
172. This argument is similar to the argument made above that supposes Anghie
would regard a cooperative border as a positive development. See supra Part V.A.
173. See MAMDANI, supra note 42 at 166, citing Uganda's control over the rural
pastoral economy as an example of how the colonial era destroyed this economy,
"[r]edrawing of boundaries leading to loss of pastures, administrative restrictions on
mobility, and confiscation of stock were the three dimensions of an official policy that
spelled disaster for pastoralism as a nondestructive way of life."
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determination. This, in essence, is a statement that uti possidetisjuris
may be incompatible with self-determination-the post-colonial state
may reflect the vision of a former power, but not the vision of those
within it. Moreover, when posited against economic and cooperative
conceptualizations of borders, the internal attack explicitly reinforces this
incompatibility by suggesting that such interpretations may reinforce a
colonial legacy of economic and political inequalities. 74 By preserving
colonial-era structures of governance, the post-colonial state can prevent
a self from manifesting, especially a self-governing self.
VI.

Conclusion

In light of the three cases above, where might uti possidetisjuris
stand now?
I began with the argument that uti possidetis juris is tenuously
linked to democracy via another tenuous link to self-determination. The
decision and dissent in Qatar v. Bahrain suggested two alternate
interpretations of post-colonial borders: an economic interpretation and
a cooperative interpretation. The economic interpretation was evident in
alternate forms in two other disputes. Those parties to the disputes that
suggested the economic interpretation did not regard their borders as
representative of the polity-the only exception being Nigeria. The
Court has reacted to this interpretation by implicitly recognizing a
disputed border may be economic, but avoiding resting its decision upon
these grounds or altering the border to better represent these interests.
The Court has followed the logic of uti possidetis juris in these
decisions, refusing to alter borders as they were established in the
relevant pre-independence documentary evidence. But the Court has not
explicitly relied upon utipossidetisjurisas grounds for these decisions.
The Court upholds the colonial-era administrative borders as the
post-colonial borders. But by implicitly suggesting the economic
interests of a party were a determinative factor in these decisions, the
Court is also recognizing that these borders were not necessarily
administrative (Qatar v. Bahrain), nor are they currently (Cameroon v.
This recognition may have
Nigeria, Botswana v. Namibia).
unintentionally led to the suggestion that the post-colonial borders may
not have been, nor currently be, representative of the polity or of the
administration of the polity, and rather, of the economic interests of the
state.
174.

This is not universally true. For instance, citizens of Jordan consider themselves

Jordanians. See generally, ROBERT B. SATLOFF, FROM ABDULLAH TO HUSSEIN (Oxford U.
Press 1994); see also WM. ROGER Louis, THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1945-

1951 (Oxford U. Press 1984).
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The external and internal attacks on the post-colonial state reinforce
this point, if not add further depth to it. The external argument suggests
that by upholding the borders, the Court is reinforcing the imposition of a
foreign concept and a foreign identity. In Cameroon v. Nigeria and
Botswana v. Namibia, the Court further reinforces the external attack by
disregarding arguments regarding the occupancy of the disputed territory
by a state's polity, and instead upholding borders that are consequently
unrepresentative of the polity. However, if in either case the Court was
to have determined a border based on the economic interests of a state, it
would also have reinforced a conceptualization of a border as
unrepresentative of the polity.
Additionally, the internal attack suggests that an economic
interpretation of borders would only reinforce the colonial economic and
political legacy within the post-colonial state. But the internal attack also
suggests that by upholding the colonial-era borders, the Court may also
be assisting in preserving the colonial legacy. Post-colonial borders and
the economic interpretation of these borders have presented the Court
with a catch-22: if it upholds the borders, it is preserving the flaws of the
colonial legacy; if it alters the borders based on economic considerations,
it is preserving the flaws of the colonial legacy.
The only solution suggested in these attacks is a cooperative
interpretation of borders. This solution may avoid the issues inherent in
uti possidetis juris by re-creating the post-colonial border in such a
manner that identity is not inherent in the shared region. Moreover, a
border may be both non-representative and representative of the polity at
the same time. However, Botswana v. Namibia suggests that even a
cooperative border may exist for economic purposes also, and in light of
the internal attack, that which was sought to be undermined would only
be reinforced.
Where does uti possidetis juris stand now? Perhaps Stephen
Ratner's assessment of uti possidetis juris as an idiot rule is the best
assessment of where it stands now. As an idiot rule, uti possidetisjuris
serves as the last barrier between terra nullius and order. 75 But it is
evident above that to call uti possidetis juris a "rule" is to give it too
much credibility, especially when the I.C.J. has actively avoided using it
as grounds for a decision.176 Thus, uti possidetis juris is not an "idiot
175. See Ratner, supra note 9 at 617. "Uti possidetis thus represents the classic
example of what Thomas Franck has called an 'idiot rule'-a simple, clear norm that
offers an acceptable outcome in most situations but whose very clarity undermines its
legitimacy in others."
176. This is true even after FrontierDispute (Benin/Niger), where the principle was
applied because both parties had signed a Special Agreement to refer the case to the
I.C.J., in which they stated they "are in agreement on the relevance of the principle of uti
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rule." Rather, it is a conceptual barrier increasingly unrelated to issues of

democracy and increasingly challenged by economic development. Its
only remaining justification for existence appears to be as the last wall
between order and disorder in the post-colonial world.
Where will uti possidetis juris end up? Perhaps most apparent
above is that post-colonial borders are increasingly under attack, both
legally and diplomatically, over present or future economic interests.
Nowhere is this more present than in Latin America, where uti possidetis

juris has its roots.1 77 These new disputes are not over polities. Nor are
they over conflicting identities of the polities within post-colonial
borders. Rather, the disputes are over resources. The ultimate irony,
then, is that the states that benefited from the stability afforded to them
via uti possidetisjuris are seeking to create instability in their hunt for
natural resources and economic advantage.
Going forward, the question will be whether the Court will continue
to rely on the logic of uti possidetis juris as a guiding concept for
stability as states increasingly seek to undermine it.

The Court's

decisions in these three cases suggest that it will continue to uphold postcolonial borders in the face of increasingly complicated issues. Given
the already tenuous link between post-colonial states and democracy,
such an approach may only serve to further undermine prospects for
democracy in the post-colonial world.

possidetis juris for the purposes of determining their common border." See Frontier
Dispute (Benin/Niger),supra note 47 at para. 23. Therefore, it is arguable that the Court
in this instance is only applying uti possidetisjuris because both parties requested its
application.
177. Jack Epstein sums up the current disputes in Latin America:
A dispute between Chile and Peru over a maritime dividing line persists despite
a 1999 pact; Guyana and Surinam are fighting over an oil-rich marine area off
the Corentyne River that separates the two nations; at least 1,000 Honduran
fishermen have been arrested by Nicaragua during the past 10 years over sea
rights in the shrimp-rich Gulf of Fonseca; and Venezuela claims Guyana's
Florida-sized Essequibo area, home to gold, diamond and timber investments.
Caracas argues that it was unfairly stripped of the region in a 19th-century
arbitration decision.
Jack Epstein, Silicon Jack, LATIN TRADE, Jan. 2003, at 24.

